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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS YOUNGFIELD,.
Industrial Commission
Case No. 87000510

Applicant,
vs.

Administrative Law Judge:
Gilbert A. Martinez

SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY,
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

Court of Appeals No.:
880114-CA

Defendants/Appellants,

Calendar Priority #6

and SECOND INJURY FUND,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Respondent.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

The threshold issue of whether the incident for
which

Douglas

Youngfield

claims

benefits

constituted an accident is not one which appellants
have raised on appeal.
Point II. Mr. Youngfield did not sustain his burden regarding
the issue of legal causation in the proceedings
below.

He did not present any evidence to show

that his employment presented him with something
which substantially increased the risk he faced in
everyday life because of his preexisting condition.
Point III. The finding that the legal causation test set forth
in Allen v. Industrial Com'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986) , was met in this case cannot be sustained
because it is not based on any facts which show

that

the

activities

Mr. Youngfield

engaged

amounted to unusual or extraordinary e x e r t i o n .

in
The

finding i s , instead, based on the mere conclusion
asserted
n

"lifting

by the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
an o b j e c t

weighing

Law Judge
47 1/2

that

pounds

represents an 'unusual and extraordinary exertion'
n

. . .

Point IV. The award of benefits to Mr. Youngfield cannot be
sustained

in t h i s case because the medical cause

t e s t s e t forth in Allen, supra* was not considered
by the Administrative Law Judge or the Commission.
Medical

causation

is

a prerequisite

for

a

compensable injury and i f there i s no finding of
medical causation, there i s no compensable in3ury.
The finding need not be based on the opinion of a
medical

panel

alone,

but

when t h e r e

u n c e r t a i n t y or complexity as t o the

is

any

connection

between the work-related event and the in}ury, a
medical

panel

should

be u t i l i z e d

to aid

the

Commission and f a i l u r e t o r e f e r the i s s u e t o a
panel i s an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n .
ARGDMENT
POINT I .
WHETHER THE APPLICANT'S INJURY
OCCURRED "BY ACCIDENT" IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS
CASE.

2

In

their

discussion

of

brief,
the

respondents

i s s u e whether

i n j u r y o c c u r r e d by a c c i d e n t
the

discussion

is

the

devote

several

finding

that

the

in t h i s c a s e i s proper*

premised

on a s t a t e m e n t

in

(Brief

of

Respondents,

s t a t e m e n t , h o w e v e r , was f o l l o w e d

to

appellants'

pp.

a

applicant's
The need

t h a t " i t i s arguable whether t h e f i r s t p r e r e q u i s i t e ,
established •"

pages

tor

brief

accidentr
8-10.)

was
That

by:

N e v e r t h e l e s s , the issue the
Commission
a d d r e s s e d i n t h i s c a s e was n o t w h e t h e r t h e
i n j u r y o c c u r r e d by a c c i d e n t , b u t whether t h e r e
was a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i n j u r y and
t h e employment.
(Brief

of

Appellants,

Commission's

finding

p.

12.)

Appellants

o f an a c c i d e n t

an i s s u e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n

in t h i s

have n o t
appeal

raised

and i t

is

the
not

here.

POINT I I .
LEGAL CAUSATION REQUIRES A SHOWING
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTED SOMETHING
SUBSTANTIAL TO INCREASE THE RISK A PERSON WITH
A PREEXISTING CONDITION ALREADY FACES IN
EVERYDAY LIFE BECAUSE OF HIS CONDITION AND THE
APPLICANT DID NOT MAKE SUCH A SHOWING IN THIS
CASE.
A claimant
showing

his

increased

the

with a p r e e x i s t i n g

employment
risk

establish

that

Industrial

Com'n,

this
the

workplace

required

he a l r e a d y f a c e d

he

case offered

condition

suffered

729 P . 2 d 1 5 , 25

3

his

burden.

his

that

which

in order

to

Allen

v.

The a p p l i c a n t

in

e l e m e n t or r i s k

in

The a c t i v i t y

in

injury.

no e v i d e n c e o f an a d d i t i o n a l

He t e s t i f i e d

exertion

in everyday l i f e

(Utah 1 9 8 6 ) .

w h i c h would s u s t a i n

shotgun s h e l l s .

extra

a compensable

which he was engaged a t t h e t i m e of
of

some

b e a r s t h e burden of

i n j u r y was l i f t i n g

a box

t h e box w e i g h e d b e t w e e n

75

and 100 pounds.
excessive
risk#

Evidence t h a t he was required t o l i f t

o b j e c t s of

w e i g h t might show the n e c e s s a r y a d d i t i o n a l

element or

but e v i d e n c e

weight

proved

the

later

submitted by a p p e l l a n t s of t h e

box weighed

47 1 / 2

pounds.

The

actual

applicant

o f f e r e d no other evidence t o show t h a t h i s e x e r t i o n exceeded t h a t
which the average person must make in nonemployment l i f e .
is

nothing

resulted

in the

r e c o r d t o show t h a t

the

from a n y t h i n g but a s t r a i g h t

lift

applicant's
of

There
injury

a 47 1/2 pound

o b j e c t t h a t wasn't cumbersome or awkward, without a s l i p or t w i s t
adding e x c e s s i v e s t r a i n .

His work added nothing t o the personal

r i s k he brought with him t o the workplace.
is

done f r e q u e n t l y by people o f f

L i f t i n g 47 1/2 pounds

the job emptying garbage c a n s ,

l i f t i n g small c h i l d r e n f l i f t i n g p e t s , changing t i r e s ,

etc.

POINT I I I .
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE
LEGAL CAUSATION TEST OF ALLEN IS MET IN THIS
CASE IS BASED ON A MERE CONCLUSION AND IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE
DETERMINATION OF LEGAL CAUSATION TO BE MADE.
Respondents
731

P.2d

1079

determining

c i t e P r i c e River Coal Co. v .
(Utah

whether

1986) ,
legal

Respondents/ p p . 1 3 f 1 4 . )

to

show

causation

"the

Industrial
proper

exists."

Com'n,

steps

for

(Brief

of

The Court in P r i c e River s t a t e d ,

The q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e e m p l o y m e n t
a c t i v i t i e s of a given employee are s u f f i c i e n t
t o s a t i s f y t h e l e g a l standard of unusual or
e x t r a o r d i n a r y e f f o r t i n v o l v e s two s t e p s .
F i r s t , the agency must determine as a matter
of f a c t e x a c t l y what were t h e employmentr e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s of t h e injured employee.
S e c o n d , the agency must d e c i d e whether t h o s e
activities
amounted to unusual
or
extraordinary exertion.
This
Second

determination is a mixed question of law and
fact.
731 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added.)

The Court went on to s t a t e

t h a t the Commission's findings as to what the injured worker's
j o b - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s were inadequate t o enable the Court to
determine whether the workers' a c t i v i t i e s "rose to the level
necessary to s a t i s f y the 'unusual or e x t r a o r d i n a r y '
threshold

established

p r e e x i s t i n g problems."

by A l l e n for

exertion

injured employees with

731 P.2d at 1083.

The employee worked

a l o n e and h i s employer and his widow presented

conflicting

testimony regarding his a c t i v i t i e s in the workplace on the day he
died.

The findings of the Administrative Law Judge in the case

did not resolve the c o n f l i c t s .

He found that the employee died

"as the result of an accident in the course of his employment . .
• r e s u l t i n g from unusual exertion and s t r e s s connected with his
employment."

I£.

The Court s t a t e d ,

I t may be argued t h a t t h i s i s a sufficient
f i n d i n g of l e g a l c a u s e t o w a r r a n t our
a f f i r m i n g t h e Commission on t h i s p o i n t .

However the "finding" <?f ungual exertion anfl

s t r e s s is nothing more than a conclusion. I t
i s not supported by anything t h a t could be
construed as a finding as to precisely what
[ t h e worker] was doing on the day of h i s
death.
We c a n n o t a f f i r m such a mixed

cpnpiMgjQp of fact and law when its necessary

premises are not evident.
Id.

(emphasis added.)

As in Price River, in t h i s case the

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e ' s finding t h a t " l i f t i n g

an object

weighing 47 1/2 pounds represents an 'unusual and extraordinary
exertion' to establish proof of legal causation" is nothing more
than a c o n c l u s i o n .

The Administrative Law Judge found that "a
5

Twentieth Century person performing non-employment life activities
would not be generally expected to lift an object of 47 1/2 pounds
during

a normal day away from work," but this is merely a

statement

which is not supported by anything that could be

construed as a finding that establishes the exertion required to
lift 47 1/2 pounds as an unusual or extraordinary exertion.
stated previously/ the conclusion's premise is flawed.

As

It is not

at all unusual or extraordinary for individuals to lift 47 1/2
pound objects on a regular daily basis.

Garbage cans, small

children, pets, brief cases, suitcases, etc. are commonly in
excess of 47 1/2 pounds and are lifted daily by individuals in
their nonemployment lives.
As the Court stated in Price River, the determination of
unusual or extraordinary exertion is "a mixed question of law and
fact."

It cannot be supported by a mere assertion that the facts

in question satisfy the legal standard.

Allen v. Industrial

Com'n, supra, gave clear direction to the Commission for the
determination of the question of fact.

It set forth a list of

typical activities and exertions expected of men and women in the
later part of the 20th century.

729 P.2d at 26, 27.

It is

incumbent upon the Commission to at least compare the lifting of a
47 1/2 pound box to the activities set forth in Allen to support a
finding that the activity amounted to unusual or extraordinary
exertion.

As in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Coin'rit supra,

this Court

cannot

be called

6

upon to affirm

"such a mixed

conclusion of tact and law when its necessary premises are not
evident."

731 P.2d at 1083.
POINT IV. THE FINDING THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF
LEGAL CAUSE IS SATISFIED CANNOT ALONE SUPPORT
AN AWARD OF BENEFITS; THERE MUST ALSO BE A
FINDING OF MEDICAL CAUSATION, WHICH REQUIRES
MEDICAL PANEL INPUT IN CASES OF MEDICAL
UNCERTAINTY OR COMPLEXITY.

In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n, supra, the Court
stated^

Since [the employee] brought heart disease to
the workplace, before legal causation can be
established, the Commission must find that his
employment a c t i v i t i e s involved e x e r t i o n or
s t r e s s in excess of the normally expected
l e v e l of nonemployment a c t i v i t y for men and
women in the l a t t e r half of the t w e n t i e t h
century. If such a finding is made, then the
r e q u i r e m e n t of l e g a l cause i s s a t i s f i e d
because i t i s presumed t h a t the employment
increased the risk of injury to which that
w o r k e r was o t h e r w i s e s u b j e c t i n h i s
nonemployment l i f e .
At t h a t p o i n t , the
inquiry s h i f t s to medical cause, i . e . , whether
the injured p a r t y ' s work-related a c t i v i t i e s
were, in fact, causally linked to the injury.
Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26.
731 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added.)

In t h i s case, the inquiry

never shifted to the question of medical cause.

In their brief,

respondents a s s e r t :
Upon review of cases in which the standards
e s t a b l i s h e d in Allen are applied without a
previous finding respecting medical causation,
the Utah Supreme Court has concluded where
a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t medical causation has been
established from the record.
In support of t h e i r a s s e r t i o n , respondents c i t e Utah Transit
Authority v. Booth, 728 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1986), Miera v. Industrial
Com'n, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986), and Richfield Care Center v.
7

Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987).
Booth # h o w e v e r ,

the

applicant

p r e e x i s t i n g back condition*

In Utah T r a n s i t Authority v .
was

not

shown t o

728 P.2d a t 1014.

have

any

The evidence on

the record was t h a t the a p p l i c a n t , while working, f e l t a popping
in h i s back, accompanied by sharp p a i n , and had t o be l i f t e d
of h i s bus d r i v e r s '

s e a t and taken t o the S a l t Lake I n d u s t r i a l

C l i n i c where a CAT Scan r e v e a l e d a b u l g i n g d i s c
1013).

out

(728 P.2d a t

Because t h e r e was no p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n , t h i s evidence

clearly

and d i r e c t l y
n

conclusion t h a t
record."

the

without

more, t h e

Court's

[m]edical causation was a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d by the

728 P . 2 d

Torgerson,

supported,

at

1014.

applicant

In R i c h f i e l d

suffered

Care C e n t e r

from a p r e e x i s t i n g

v.

back

c o n d i t i o n and the Administrative Law Judge submitted the matter t o
a medical panel for e v a l u a t i o n .

733 P.2d a t 179.

In Miera v.

I n d u s t r i a l Com'n, where the a p p l i c a n t had a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n ,
t h e m a t t e r a l s o was submitted t o a medical p a n e l .
1024.

728 P.2d a t

The Court s t a t e d ,
The m e d i c a l c a u s a t i o n t e s t i s l i k e w i s e
s a t i s f i e d by the medical p a n e l ' s finding t h a t
" t h e work a c t i v i t i e s as d e s c r i b e d over a
t h r e e - d a y period could produce a lumbar s p r a i n
a g g r a v a t i n g t h e p r e e x i s t i n g problem he had had."
Medical c a u s a t i o n in a case in which the a p p l i c a n t s u f f e r s a

preexisting condition

i s a question of whether the

work-related e x e r t i o n led t o the r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y .
a t 27.

applicant's

Allen, supra,

The question i s not answered by any finding regarding the

sufficiency
requirement.

of

the

exertion

legal

causation

Nor i s i t answered by r e l i a n c e on the

applicant's

8

to

meet

the

testimony that the exertion caused his injuryf especially in a
case such as this.

The incident for which the applicant claims

benefits occurred on February 5, 1987. The applicant continued to
work and did not seek medical treatment for the injury he claims
resulted from the incident until February 12, 1987.
Respondents refer to flgne yt JfF, Shea CQt, 728 P.3d 1008
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that referral to a medical panel
is permissive/ not mandatory.

In Hone. however, the Court

remanded on the basis that it was unable to dispose of the medical
causation question because the Administrative Law Judge did not
allow the applicant to present medical evidence pertinent to the
issue of medical causation.

728 P.2d at 1012.

The Court itself

found legal causation, under the Allen standard, on the evidence
in the record.

The applicant had suffered no preexisting injuries

and therefore needed to show only that his injury occurred during
a usual or ordinary exertion on the job.

The Court stated,

The evidence is undisputed that the claimant
was injured as he began to put on "heavy and
unwieldy coveralls" at work. Those coveralls
were required for the outdoor construction
work in which the claimant was engaged. Proof
of legal causation is further substantiated by
the fact that immediately after the incident
the claimant saw the nurse at the work site
first aid station, where the back pain was
first diagnosed.
728 P.2d at 1011, 1012.
determination

Nevertheless, the Court remanded "for a

of medical causation and a subsequent

consistent with this opinion."
stated,

9

728 P.2d at 1012.

ruling

The Court also

Although referral to the medical panel is not
required by statute, we believe in this case
that the findings of that panel would aid the
administrative law judge. See Champion Home
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d
306, 308 (Utah 1985) (evidence of causal
connection between work-related event and the
injury may be uncertain or highly technical
whereby failure to refer the case may be an »...
abuse of discretion).
Id .

If

the

findings

of

a medical

panel

would

aid

the

Administrative Law Judge in a case in which no question of
preexisting condition is present and no gap between the incident
and treatment for injury occurred/ certainly the findings of a
medical panel should be utilized to assist the Commission in this
case.

The language of Champion Home Builders v. Industrial

Commission, supra, establishes that where evidence of causal
connection between the event and the injury may be uncertain or
highly technical, failure to refer the matter to a medical panel
is an abuse

of discretion.

Where, as here, neither

the

Administrative Law Judge nor the Commission addressed the question
of medical causation, the evidence of causal connection between
the event and the injury must be said to be uncertain.
CONCLUSION
When an employee with a preexisting condition seeks benefits
for an injury associated with an incident at work, the Commission
must apply the law as set forth in Allen, supra, to determine
whether the injury is compensable.

There must be a finding of

accident, and a finding of a legal causal connection and a
medical causal connection between the injury and the employment.
10

The legal causal connection must be supported by an objective
finding supported by facts showing the employee's action while at
work exceeded the exertion the average person typically undertakes
in nonemployment

life.

simply be imputed.
purpose.

The medical causal connection cannot

The stringencies of the law exist for a

The workers' compensation

laws of Utah serve a

beneficent function, but they are not meant to compensate workers
for injuries resulting from the personal risks they carry with
them into the workplace.
Appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse the
Commission's decision awarding benefits to Douglas Youngfieldf or,
in the alternative/ to remand to the Commission with direction
that the issues presented on appeal be determined in accordance
with the

proper application of the workers' compensation statutes

as described in Allen, supra, and the other decisions of this
Court controlling these issues.
/^

DATED this

'~j

day of September, 1988.

/ $ /

James R. Black

bl
Wendy Moseley
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Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20026.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 14, 1986.
Worker, who sustained lower back injuries while stacking milk crates containing
four to six gallons of milk, sought review
of an order of the Industrial Commission,
denying his motion for review of an order
of an administrative law judge denying his
workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
finding that worker's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's
claim would be remanded for further fact
finding as to whether action of worker,
who had previous back problems, in lifting
several piles of milk crates exceeded exertion which average person typically undertook in nonemployment life and whether
medically demonstrable causal link existed
between worker's lifting and injury to his
back.
Vacated and remanded.
Hall, C.J., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart,
Associate C.J., joining in the dissent.
Stewart, Associate C.J., dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Evidence <s=»18
Supreme Court took judicial notice that
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid
water or approximately eight and one-third
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the
containers and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and crate.
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2. Workers' Compensation <s=»515
For purposes of workers' compensation, key requirement of an "accident" is
that occurrence be unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where either
cause of injury or result of exertion is
different from what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by
"accident"; clarifying Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

3. Workers' Compensation <3=>515
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof of unusual event may be helpful
in determining causal connection between
injury and employment; however, proof of
unusual event is not required as an element
of requirement that injury be "by accident." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>515
An "accident," for purposes of requirement that injury be "by accident" to be
compensable under Workers' Compensation
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the
result of an injury; abandoning Redman
Warehousing Corp. v.
Industrial
Comm% 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 R2d 283;
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
5. Workers' Compensation <s=»568
Key question in workers' compensation
case in determining causation is whether,
given worker's body and worker's exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
6. Workers' Compensation <s»552, 568
Only those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required
by employment increases risk of injury
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which worker normally faces in his everyday life is compensable under Workers'
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally occur at work because preexisting
condition results in symptoms which appear
during work hours without any enhancement from the work place are not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
7c Workers' Compensation <s=>597
For purposes of workers' compensation, two-part causation test, requiring consideration of legal cause and medical cause
of injury, is required in determining whether causal connection exists between injury
and worker's employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Eke. Serv, v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah);
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp.f 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah); Schmidt u Industrial Commission, 617 P02d 693 (Utah); Residential and
Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-45.
9. Workers' Compensation <s=»597
For purposes of legal causation element of two-part test for determining
whether causal connection exists between
claimant's injury and claimant's employment, precipitating exertion must be compared with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in
general, not nonemployment life of the particular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
10. Workers' Compensation <&»597
Under medical causation portion of
two-part test for determining whether
causal connection exists between claimant's
injury and claimant's employment, claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to resulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
lie Workers' Compensation <S=»1390
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness
of employee's exertions may be relevant to
medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant's employment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
12. Workers9 Compensation <©=»1533
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was not "by accident" as claimant was
stacking milk crates was not based on the
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant
had not complained of pain or limitations at
his job, and no evidence indicated that injury was predictable or developed gradually
as with occupational disease or progressive
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

8. Workers' Compensation <©=>553
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury,
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re- 13, Workers' Compensation ^1950
quired to prove "legal causation," for purCompensation claim of worker, who
poses of two-part causation test for deter- had preexisting back problems and susmining • whether causal connection exists tained lower back injuries while stacking
between claimant's injury and claimant's crates containing four to six gallons of
employment; where there is no preexisting milk, was remanded for further fact findcondition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is ing on issue as to whether moving and
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lifting several piles of crates weighing 30
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler
exceeded exertion average person typically
undertook in nonemployment life and
'whether there was medically demonstrable
causal link between worker's action in lifting milk crates and injury to his back and,
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose
out of or in the course of employment."
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Second Injury.
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund.
DURHAM, Justice:
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review
from the Industrial Commission's denial of
his motion for review of an administrative
law judge order denying him compensation
for a back injury sustained at work. For
the reasons stated below, we reverse and
remand.
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged 36, was employed as night manager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testified to the following version of events at a
hearing before an administrative law
judge. The claimant was working in a
confined cooler in the store stacking crates,
containing four to six gallons* of milk,
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While
lifting one crate to about chest level, he
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower
back. He immediately set down the crate
and asked another employee to continue
stocking the shelves. The claimant completed the one-half hour remaining in his
shift doing desk work. That night the pain
increased, and by morning his left leg felt
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr.
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during December were
followed through with the prescribed treat1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs
about the same as liquid water or approximately
8'/3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
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ment of bed rest and medication. A myelogram finally revealed a herniated disc, and
the claimant spent ten days in traction in
the hospital in early January. He did not
return to work.
The claimant also testified he had a history of prior back injuries, including a fall
from a telephone pole at age fourteen
which required him to wear a back brace
for several months, a back injury in 1977
while lifting sand bags for the Logan
School District, and another fall while
working for that employer when he slipped
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted
in prolonged absences from work.
The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claimant. The employer's report of injury describes the accident as "picking up freight
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes
and stacking them from truck." No specific event was mentioned in the employer's
report. The medical records of treating
physicians described the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted any reference to a
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan,
who examined the claimant on December
31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember
any distinct episode as having precipitated
his current problem, however." And in a
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history
was related as follows: "About six weeks
ago, however, he was lifting material at
work, and recalls no specific injury or
stress but developed discomfort in his left
groin area which ultimately extended into
his big toe."
The administrative law judge found that
the claimant's injury to his back on November 23, 1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment." It is apparent that the administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" because there was no identifiable
tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh
approximately 50 pounds without the containers
and crate.

1
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event that caused the injury and because
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and
commonplace exertion expected of the job.
The administrative law judge analogized
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980), where a gradually developed back
injury was held to be not compensable
where the condition worsened without the
intervention of any external occurrence or
trauma.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting
back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his
job, was injured "by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment'' as required by the Workers' Compensation Act,
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986). That
Act, in pertinent part, provides:
Every employee ... who is injured ...
by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment ... shall be
paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites
for a finding of a compensable injury.
First, the injury must be "by accident/'
Second, the language "arising out of or in
the course of employment" requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often failed to
distinguish the analysis of the accident
question from the discussion of causation
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the
Commission are faced with confusing and
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea2. We note that many of our prior opinions so
intermingled the causation and accident analyses that it is impossible to segregate them and
determine the basis for the Court's decision.
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the accident and causation elements in the following
language: "It appears to be mere coincidence
that defendant's injury . . . occurred at work.
Defendant bears the burden of showing otherwise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties
of employment to unexpected injury is simply
lacking.... [T]he Commission's conclusion
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
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son we now undertake a fresh look at the
policy and historical background of the
workers' compensation statute in an attempt to provide a clear and workable rule
for future application by the Commission.
I.
The term "by accident" is not defined in
the workers' compensation statutes. The
most frequently referenced authority for
the definition of "by accident" is the case
of Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), where the
term was defined as follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events....
[Tjhis is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such manner
as to properly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as occupational
diseases....
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)).
Some confusion has developed as to whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual event. This issue frequently arises
when the employee suffers an internal failure 3 brought about by exertions in the
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (footnotes omitted). See also Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590
P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963).
For an example of an opinion which does separate the accident and causation analysis, see
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of
injuries that arise from general organ or structural failure brought about by an exertion in the
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our
cases have defined "by accident" to include
internal failures resulting from both usual
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah 1980).
This Court first discussed the term "by
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278
(1922), where an accident was said to be
"something out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to time
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281.
This definition was used to distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were
covered under statutory provisions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where
the claimant suffers an internal failure the
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903]
A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling
observed:
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley,
nothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
It is enough
that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which on
a particular occasion is neither designed
nor expected. The test as to whether an
injury is unexpected, and so, if received
on a single occasion, occurs 'by accident/
is that the sufferer did not intend or
expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was
doing."
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in The Drafting of Workmen 's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev.
328, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident.
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabili-
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After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal
failure cases on the ground that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v.
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the ground
that no overexertion occurred during the
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104.
That decision was apparently overruled,
however, when the Court embraced the
"unexpected result" rule and awarded compensation to an employee who suffered a
heart attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir.
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was followed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accident" since the result was "an unusual,
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place.
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Indiestrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of
benefits to a claimant who had suffered
from heart disease and experienced a heart
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary
duties. The Court pointed out, in dicta,
that the English common law would have
awarded compensation even if the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138
P.2d at 23&-39. Quoting from the Bohlen
article, supra, the Court observed:
ty under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?,
1981 Utah L.Rev. 393.
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"[N]othing more is required than that
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
The element of
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident* is sufficiently supplied ... if,
though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him who suffers it"
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237.
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly
adopted the English rule for the definition
of an accident and awarded benefits to a
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back
while stepping on the brake pedal of a
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activity See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70.
After summarizing early Utah cases interpreting "by accident" the Court concluded
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly
held that an unexpected internal failure
meets the requirements of ["by accident"]
4c The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373,
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never been
cited by this or any other court to support the
law of that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods, Corp. v.
Grantham, 263 Ala, 179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204,
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave <fr
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) {Purity Biscuit cited
as stating majority position that usual exertion
causing an internal failure may be by accident);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964)
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit);
Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308, 314
(Fla.1962) (back herniation from rupture of intervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964)
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered workmen's compensation case" that supported an
award where many factors led to the disability);
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208,
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave,
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a
compensable injury where the causal relationship is established); Neylon v. Ford Motor Co.,
10 N.J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu>
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and the legislature by failing to amend has
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968.
The holding of Purity Biscuit also
squarely embraced the concept that an ordinary or usual exertion that results in an
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After
carefully considering the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation statute,
prior precedent, and public policy, the
Court rejected the requirement that proof
of an unusual activity or exertion be a
required element of the "by accident" definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at
967-70. The Court concluded that "there
is nothing in the statute which would justify a holding that an injury is compensable
where overexertion is shown but is not
compensable where only ordinary exertion
is shown, provided that in both cases it is
shown that the exertion causes the injury." 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970.
rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an
"injury by accident"); Olson v. State IndusL
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring) (dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooper v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 747,
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an example of the divergent viewpoints for defining a
compensable accident).
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases.
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah
612, 244 P.2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202;
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen
concluded without further discussion that "[t]he
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy
reappraisement" 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse."
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 P.2d at 286. After
considering those cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit,
we now cannot agree that it was a "living
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah
1980).
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases
have held that an internal injury may be
compensable if it results from either a
usual or unusual exertion in the course of
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer
caused by lifting an unusually heavy
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v.
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and
unanticipated heart attack resulting from
exertion while inspecting roof structure);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from
shoveling coal compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting
from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980)
(back injury resulting from carrying steel
plates compensable despite prior history of
back disorders and ordinary activity);
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp.,
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver
suffered heart attack after repeatedly
climbing long steps); Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974)
(back injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial Commission,
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P,2d 740 (1967) (heart
distress occurring over a period of several
months compensable despite preexisting
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965)
(back injury resulting from filing papers in
lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support
for applying the "unexpected result" rule
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases,
a separate line of opposing authority has
developed which requires overexertion or
an unusual event to prove an injury occurred "by accident." Typically, these
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cases denied compensation because the
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there were no
events or exertions that were unusual or
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident"
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar- >
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982)
(back injury from loading box of twelve
radios into van not compensable); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant
with preexisting condition resulting from
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable since the activity was not unusual or
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury
suffered by janitor upon standing up not
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury
precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not compensable without proof of
an unusual event). These cases will not be
collectively referred to as the Redman line
of cases.
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the
historical and logical definition of "by accident." The Redman line of cases relied on
the following abridged version of the definition of an accident found in Carling v.
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual
course of events.1' 16 Utah at 261, 399
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted
phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident. This interpretation misconstrues the
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent
with the English definition of "by accident"
used by this Court since 1922. The key
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions,
was that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase emphasized that where either the
cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore "by accident"
Policy considerations also militate in favor of rejecting the notion that the phrase
"by accident" requires an unusual event.
There is nothing in the term "accident"
that suggests that only that which is unusual is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40,
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring;
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does
not occur simply because a worker is injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson
in his treatise on workmen's compensation
with the following example:
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load,
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain,
a passerby observing him would not say
that he was undergoing an accident
merely because it is unusual to mow
lawns in the rain.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual
distinction as being unworkable in practice.
Realistically, it is impossible to determine
what are the usual and normal requirements of a job. People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well
as light ones, and work for long hours as
well as short ones. None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id.
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168.
The unworkability of the usual-unusual
event requirement is further evidenced by
comparing seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court. Compare Kaiser
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back injury to miner with previous back problems

held to be a compensable accident despite
being caused by shoveling coal in the usual
course of employment); with Farmer's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237
(no accident where worker with previous
back problems sustained back injury while
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable
accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) with Billings
Computer Corp, v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104
(no accident where worker sustained knee
injury resulting from bending to pick up
small parts).
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real
concern in the Redman line of cases was
the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of compensation
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed
in the next section, the Court has developed
two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires an unusual event in order to meet the statutory
causation requirement. Although proof of
an unusual event may be helpful in determining causation, it is not required as an
element of "by accident" in section 35-145. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident* is unexpectedness."
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those cases which hold that
an accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in
the Redman line of cases which predicates
the "accident" determination upon the occurrence of an unusual event.
II.
The second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation
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cases involving internal failures, the key
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is proved by the production
and interpretation of medical evidence either alone or together with other evidence.
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370;
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures
and because of the possibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed to
the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases.
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
This Court initially responded to the
problem of causation in internal failure
cases by suggesting that the Commission
use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused
by an exertion in the workplace.5 See
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n.
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61,
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and
convincing evidence standard was rejected,
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979),
with the rationale that such a standard
would make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the
deceased suffered from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the standard to prove
causal connection is preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
The second method that has been used to
ensure causal connection in internal failure
cases is to require proof that an unusual
event or activity precipitated the injury.
Presumably, this requirement was used to
prevent compensating a person predisposed
to internal failure where the preexisting
condition contributed more to the injury
than his usual work activity. The following internal failure cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is
necessary to prove causation. Billings
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is
still used where the employee suffers from a
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of
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Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104,
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah
1982); Church of Jesus Christ oj'LatterDay Saints v. Industrial Commission,
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952);
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D.
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 23839 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798,
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30,
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting).
Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will open the floodgates for payment
of benefits for all internal injuries that
coincidentally occur at work. They claim
that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessary to prevent the employer from
becoming a general insurer. They argue
that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a
history or indication of physical disability
or handicap will be reduced.
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us
to follow a separate line of authority that
awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace
activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged
in a workplace activity and where there is
adequate evidence of medical causation.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi,
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's back
injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 N.W.2d 454, 458
(1982).
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties
upon proof of medical causal connection
between workplace exertions and the injury); Residential and Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission,
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in
the ordinary course of work compensable);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in the normal course of employment—the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary exertion);
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v, Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 37576, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of
cases. Moreover, Residential and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation
for usual workplace activity after the Mellen decision. Clearly, the usual exertion
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah
law.
When read in chronological sequence,
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent
and confused approach to determining
when an accident arose out of or in the
course of employment. Much of this confusion can be traced to fundamental problems stemming from the use of the usualunusual distinction as a means of proving
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270. The problems in determining
what activities were usual or unusual were

recognized as long ago as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of
difficulties ... may be opened by the refinements between usual and unusual, exertion and overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by him or both/' Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The contents of the Pandora's box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora
of our cases struggling with a definition of
a compensable accident based upon the
usualness or ordinariness of an activity.
Professor Larson has also criticized the
usual-unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the activity fails to consider
that some occupations routinely require a
usual exertion capable of causing injury.
Likewise, other occupations, such as deskwork, require so little physical effort that
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient
to prove that the resulting accident arose
out of the employmento Larson, supra,
§ 38.81, at 7-270,6

6. Larson's observation is consistent with this
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exertion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at
16, 201 P.2d at 968:
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will ever
know what this court will consider sufficient
overexertion. Also under that test if the work

usually required by the job is so great that it
would break the strongest man even he will
not be able to recover. But if it is more than
usual exertion which causes the injury the
employee can recover no matter how light the
work is which causes the injury.
Id.
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[5] Because we find the present use of
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take
this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet
the objectives of the workers* compensation lawSc We are mindful that the key
question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.,
concurring specially).
[6] The language "arising out of or in
the course of his employment" found in
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was
apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a
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sufficient causal connection between the
disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b)
those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which
the worker normally faces in his everyday
life. See Bryant u Masters Machine Co.,
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the
latter type of injury is compensable under
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed
formula by which the causation issue may
be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case.
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a
two-part causation test which is consistent
with the purpose of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in determining causation. We therefore adopt that test. Larson suggests that compensable injuries can
best be identified by first considering the
legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the
test of 'arising out of the employment' ...
[then] the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have accepted the dual-causation standard suggested by
Larson include: Market Foods Distribs., Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980)
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied
compensation where injury could have been
triggered at any time during normal movement
and exertion at work not greater than typical
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La.1982)
(claimant granted compensation where injury
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater
than that in everyday nonemployment life);
Bryant v. Masters Mach. Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me.
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition
awarded compensation for back injury resulting
from fall from his stool at work because of
increased risk of falling where employees
moved around him at work); Barrett v. Herbert
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant
with preexisting back condition denied compen-
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caused this [injury]."7 Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277.
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to determine where the
employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting
condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
" Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740,
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the
legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show
that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of
his condition. This additional element of
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the preexisting condition of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather
than exertions at work. Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:
sation for injury resulting from working at normal gait since there was no work-related enhancement of personal risk); Mann v. City of
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982)
(policeman with history of heart disease awarded compensation for heart attack at home
where claimant's physician testified that attack
was caused by stress of police work rather than
personal risk factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods.
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980)
(claimant with preexisting heart problems denied compensation for heart attack suffered
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle
using objective standard of average worker in
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack).
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If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution
must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life....
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness
or disease, any exertion connected with
the employment and causally connected
with the [injury] as a matter of medical
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test
of causation.
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation.
Where there is no preexisting condition, a
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.8
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion
that the comparison between the usual and
unusual exertion be defined according to an
objective standard. "Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual
exertion in his employment but with the
exertions of normal nonemployment life of
this or any other person." Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original).
See also Johns-Manville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 I11.2d 171,178, 35
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979)
(compensation denied where the risk of the
employment activity "is no greater than
that to which he would have been exposed
had he not been so employed"); Strickland

v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497,
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed....' " Quoting from
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App.
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)).
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
App.1980) (subjective test: "the employment must involve an exertion greater than
that normally performed by the employee
during his non-employment life"). Thus,
the precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life, not the
nonemployment life of the particular worker.
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more consistent and
predictable standard for the Commission
and this Court to follow. In evaluating
typical nonemployment activity, the focus
is on what typical nonemployment activities
are generally expected of people in today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. Typical activities
and exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the 20th century, for
example, include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height,
and climbing the stairs in buildings. By

8. Larson highlights the difference between the
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we
today adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the heart attack area:
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting of
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift
medically produces a heart attack. Under the
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no
compensation, regardless of previous heart
condition. Under the suggested rule there
would be compensation, even in the presence
of a history of heart disease, because people
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a
part of nonemployment life, and therefore
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear and tear of life.
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job,
and suppose there is medical testimony that
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-

parison between this employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there
would be compensation. Under the suggested
rule the result would depend on whether
there was a personal causal element in the
form of a previously weakened heartc If
there was not, compensation would be awarded, since the employment contributed something and the employee's personal life nothing
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a
previously weakened heart], compensation
would be denied in spite of the medical causal
contribution, because legally the personal
causal contribution was substantial, while the
employment added nothing to the usual wear
and tear of life—which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders.
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote
omitted).
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using an objective standard, the case law
will eventually define a standard for typical
"nonemployment activity" in much the way
case law has developed the standard of
care for the reasonable man in tort law.
[10] 2. Medical Cause—The second
part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity. The purpose of the medical cause
test is to ensure that there is a medically
demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected
injuries that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.
With the issue being one primarily of
causation, the importance of the ...
medical panel becomes manifest. It is
through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be able to
make the determination of whether the
injury sustained by a claimant is causally
connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concurring). Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to
the resulting injury or disability. In the
event the claimant cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be
denied.9

".';
\

V

III.
[11] We now undertake to apply the
foregoing analysis to the case before us.
In reviewing findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's findings. Champion Home

Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985).
[12] We have previously stated that the
key element of whether an injury occurred
"by accident" is whether the injury was
unexpected. After reviewing the record,
we find no substantial evidence that the
injury was not unexpected. It is clear
from the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimant that he experienced an unexpected
and unanticipated injury to his back as he
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of
the cooler. Although the claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence
which indicates that this injury was predictable or that it developed gradually as with
an occupational disease or progressive back
disorder. While the employer's report of
injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in the cooler, the reports are
unhelpful in determining whether the injury was unexpected.
It appears that the administrative law
judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining an accident. We have
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on
unexpectedness. Moreover, the administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of whether an
accident occurred. We have previously
held that the aggravation or "lighting up"
of a preexisting condition by an internal
failure is a compensable accident. Powers
v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude
therefore that the decision of the Commission that the claimant's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence,
and that decision is, therefore, erroneous.
[13] The key issue in this case, like
most internal failure cases, is whether the
injury "arose out of or in the course of

- \i

vt'
r5*

i
i

4-*

9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the
medical conclusion of causal connection.
Where the injury results from latent symptoms
with an illness such as heart disease, proof of
medical causation may be especially difficult.
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases
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where compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate proof of medical causation.
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321.
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc.,
418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) (heart attack triggered
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sedentary life of average worker compensable).
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employ merit." Since the claimant had previous back problems, to meet the legal causation requirement he must show that moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the
confined area of the cooler exceeded the
exertion that the average person typically
undertakes in nonemployment life. The evidence presented by the claimant was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causation. It is unclear from
the record how many crates were moved by
the claimant, the distance the crates were
moved, the precise weight of the crates,
and the size of the area in which the lifting
and moving took place. Because the claimant did not have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further factfinding on this issue.
Moreover, the record is insufficient to
show medical causation. It is unclear from
the medical reports whether the doctors
were aware of the specific incident in the
cooler. Further, the case was not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation.
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, we are unable to determine whether
there is a medically demonstrable causal
link between the lift in the cooler and the
injury to the claimant's back. We therefore remand to the Industrial Commission
for additional evidence and findings on the
question of medical causation.
The decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded.
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case to the
Commission for the purpose of determining
lc Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143„44f 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967).
2. 115 Utah 1,201 P.2d 961 (1949).

whether the work incident aggravated a
preexisting condition such as would warrant an award of compensation.1 However,
I do not join the Court in adopting an
"unexpected result" standard to be applied
in determining the existence of a compensable accident.
I do not believe that this Court has "misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident" in the bulk of its
recent cases concerning the issue at bar.
The majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission2 is
misplaced. The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simply ignored.3 The only case in which this
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission,4 which support
is similarly without precedential value because it has also been ignored beginning
with Painter Motor Co, v. Ostler? the very
next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission6 and again
defined "accident" as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be expected to occur in the
usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
be either the cause or the result of an
injury," (Emphasis in original.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
establish policy, has chosen wording which
precludes such an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's dissent in Purison, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm 'n,
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm'n,
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).

3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs,
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).
1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Ma- 6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of
the majority's interpretation. The word
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may
be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as
an unexpected injury. The word "injury,"
on the other hand, denotes a result and not
a cause. Had the legislature only used the
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.,
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover
all results regardless of the cause. Had
the legislature only used the word "accident," then I would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended to cover both the cause and the
result. In fact, however, the legislature
has used both words "injury" and "accident." It follows that the word "accident"
must be interpreted as focusing upon the
cause and not the result. In short, the
majority's interpretation writes the word
"injury" out of the statute. Such a decision is unwarranted in my view.

STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
I dissent. The majority defines the statutory term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardless of whether it is
produced by a usual or an unusual event.
The majority also defines the term "arising
out of or in the course of employment" to

impose legal and medical causation requirements. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon the physical condition of the
worker at the time he is injured. A worker
having no preexisting medical condition or
handicap need only prove that the accident
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." But for congenitally handicapped
persons and for persons who have suffered
preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some
physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning. Such a
worker may receive compensation only if
the "employment contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of
nonemployment life." According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove
that his internal breakdown was caused by
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion"
in order to establish the requisite legal
causation, even though the majority opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving
causation." How the majority can reject
that standard for persons having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that standard
for persons with preexisting conditions, is
baffling.
Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which
a worker with a preexisting condition must
demonstrate and the "usual exertion"
which a person with no preexisting condition must demonstrate is far from clear.
The latter standard is to be judged with
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person.'" The
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating
exertion must be compared with the usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life
of the particular worker." What the term
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defined by the

7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah
Laws 610, 610.

9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917
Utah Laws 306, 322-23.

The legislature recently amended section
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits the payment of compensation to those injured "by accident arising
out of or in the course of ... employment" 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by
accident" standard has not been altered or
amended since its inception in 1917.9 The
legislature thus being satisfied with the
Court's interpretation of the term "accident" in the long line of cases beginning
with Carling v. Industrial Commission,10
I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that term.

8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974
10.
ed., Supp.1986).
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majority. The few examples set out do
little to explain the concept aimed at, other
than to suggest that the term means something more than simple, life-sustaining activities.
I wholly fail to understand why persons
who have a preexisting condition should be
placed in the disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless position, that the
majority opinion imposes upon them. The
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to
provide compensation for workers who
have preexisting medical conditions and
therefore run a greater risk of injury when
they expose themselves to the hazards of
the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than
encouraging them to abandon the work
force for some kind of unearned support.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with
preexisting conditions by spreading the
risk throughout the industry to assure such
persons that their injuries will be cared for
without imposing extraordinary liabilities
on the employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v.
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504,
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to
favor those policies which encourage people to work, rather than policies that deter
employers from offering gainful employment to those who have a higher risk of
work-related injury. There is little personal or social benefit from a policy that tends
to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries or disabilities.
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the workmen's compensation laws to
impose higher standards for compensation
on those with preexisting medical conditions than on those without. Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a
negligence action is required to take the
victim as the defendant finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may
have are disregarded. That principle
should not be, and until now has not been,

different in workmen's compensation law,
which is really a substitute for tort law
remedies. In short, handicapped or previously injured persons who are injured by
an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement.
I am also unable to understand how an
administrative law judge, the Industrial
Commission, or an appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities,, are "in today's society," as they now must do for the purpose
of determining legal causation for workers
with preexisting medical conditions. Does
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does
during his or her nonemployment activities? Is it what a professional football
player does in his leisure time or what a
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary
worker does in his or her off-hours or what
a forest ranger does?
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated
principle. The examples "include taking
full garbage cans to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings." These few examples,
which I find to be arguable in any event
since they reflect only what some people
may do from time to time, do not substitute
for a legal standard. I seriously wonder
whether changing a flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in today's society,
and I do not know how much luggage the
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or
she carries it. The point is that the majority has not set forth a workable standard at
all In fact, I have serious doubt that such
an artificial construct as "typical nonemployment activities" will produce more fair
and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical"
individual for the purpose of establishing a
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to "average"
people, and the law has always recognized
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as much. In short, I do not think that the
majority's newly established standard will
produce decisions one whit more consistent
or rational than those produced in the
past 1
The majority also holds that an injured
person must prove that the disability is
"medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I think
is unwarranted, the majority states that
"[t]he medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that
hope is seriously misplaced.
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the
source of the Court's new standards and
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of
law, but there is much to be said for the
case-by-case approach in hammering out
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede
that present law needs to be rationalized
and that some cases should be overruled
because they are hopelessly inconsistent
with other cases, but I do not believe that
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a
manner as to defeat those humane policies
intended to allow for the injuries of workers who come to the work place in an
impaired condition.
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent.

1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980.
That there are more inconsistencies the further

Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Holloway Trucking [Employer], and the
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carrier for the Employer], Defendants.
No. 20621.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1986.
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R.
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a selfemployed truck driver. On July 11, 1984,
after driving for about six hours, he
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he
slipped while walking across an oil spill on
his way to the restroom and that the slip
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. After returning from the restroom, Holloway
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires.
While crouching, he experienced an immediate sharp pain in his back which made
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver,
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days
after the incident Holloway consulted a chiropractor in Georgia. He consulted another chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake
City. The slip on the oil spill was not
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors
who examined Holloway, in the First Report of Injury, or in the claimant's report
of how the injury occurred.
The Commission denied review of the
administrative law judge's order. The
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injury was
not the result of an "accident" as that term
back one goes in our body of law is not particularly unexpected. In any event, I doubt that the
new approach will produce unwavering consistency over the years.

ADDENDUM 2:

Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Com'n,
731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986)
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Plaintiff merely asserts that defendant erally estopped defendant by the outcome
took his land from Tracy Wright, a witness of the Sullivan and Condas cases and to
in the Sullivan case. We must therefore have admitted the abstract of the record
consider whether a "predecessor in inter- from the Sullivan case.
est" of defendant's had an opportunity and
Reversed and remanded for trial.
similar motive to develop the testimony
presented in the abstract.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and
The phrase "predecessor in interest" is a ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
term of art. Rule 804 of the Federal Rules
STEWART, J., dissents.
of Evidence as originally drafted by the
Supreme Court allowed former testimony
to be used if the party against whom the
( O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
testimony was offered or a person "with
motive and interest" similar to his had an
opportunity to examine the witness. Weinstein, Evidence «804[01] (1985). The
House of Representative Judiciary Committee, however, rejected that standard as unfair and redrafted the rule to require a
PRICE RIVER COAL CO. and Insurparty's "predecessor in interest" to have
ance Co. of North America,
been present and to have had a similar
Employer-Carrier, Plaintiffs,
motive to develop the testimony. Id. The
v.
Senate adopted the version of the rule
promulgated by the House, as did Utah The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and Marie T. Mabbutt, widow of
when it adopted the Federal Rules of EviFred C. Mabbutt, deceased, Defendants.
dence. While we agree that the "predecessor in interest" requirement is broader
No. 20473.
than the common law privity requirement,
Supreme Court of Utah.
which required a common property interest
between the parties, Lloyd v. American
Dec. 31, 1986.
Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185-87
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 969, 99
S.Ct. 461, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978), we do not
Industrial Commission allowed death
find the similarity of parties here close benefits for surviving spouse of employee,
enough to permit use of the testimony who died of heart attack while working as
against defendant under the rule. In the miner. Employer filed action for review.
Sullivan case, the central issue was wheth- The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
er John Condas trespassed upon Sullivan's that: (1) employee's heart attack was "unland. While Condas presented evidence expected or unintended event" that caused
concerning all of the road, the case and his death and, therefore, was "accident"
Sullivan's main concern in cross-examina- within meaning of statute, which allows
tion focused upon the nature of !ne road compensation for dependents of employee
where it abutted Sullivan's land. We find killed by accident arising out of or in the
the relationship between Sullivan, who in course of employment; (2) establishing that
1927 tried to prove a trespass by demon- employee's heart attack arose out of or in
strating that White Pine Canyon was not the course of employment, rather than as
public where it abutted his land, and de- result of preexisting heart disease, refendant in the present action to be too quired finding that employment activities
attenuated to consider Sullivan a predeces- involved exertion or stress in excess of
sor in interest of defendant.
'normally expected level of nonemployment
Based on the foregoing, we find that it activity for persons in latter half of twentiwas error for the trial judge to have collat- eth century; and (3) remand was required
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for administrative law judge to make additional findings of fact as to what employee
was doing on day of heart attack.
Remanded.
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion
joined by Hall, C.J.
1. Workers' Compensation ^^571
Employee's heart attack while working
as belt attendant in underground coal mine
was "unexpected or unintended event" that
caused his death and, therefore, was "accident" within meaning of statute, which allows compensation for dependents of employee killed by accident arising out of or
in the course of employment. HC.A.1953,
35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Workers' Compensation <§=»571
Establishing that employee's heart at- c
tack arose out of or in the course of employment, rather than as result of preexisting heart disease, required finding that employment activities involved exertion or
stress in excess of normally expected level
of nonemployment activity for persons in
latter half of twentieth century. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45.
3e Workers' Compensation <s=>1949
Inadequacy of administrative law
judge's findings as to what employee's activities were on day of death while working
alone justified remand for more detailed,
resolution of conflicting testimony, findings and determination whether activities
amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion causing heart attack that arose out
of or in course of employment. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation <&»1536
Evidence that belt attendant job was
sometimes performed by women did not
establish that job required less than extraordinary effort or strain and that male
employee's heart attack was caused by
preexisting heart disease, rather than
course of employment.
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5. Workers' Compensation <s=*1949
Uncertainty as to whether administrative law judge intended to apply correct
legal standard when it used words, "unusual exertion," in concluding that employee's heart attack arose out of or in course
of employment justified remand for application of proper standard to determine legal cause. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 351-45.
6. Workers' Compensation @=»1730
Medical panel, which served purpose of
taking facts as found by administrative law
judge and assisting administrative law
judge to decide whether medical cause has
been proven, does not serve role of resolving conflicts in factual evidence with regard to injured party's activities. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=»1730
Administrative law judge permitting
medical panel to resolve factual disputes
improperly abdicates function.
U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-45, 35-1-85.

James M. Elegante, Erie V. Boorman,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Virginius
Dabney, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial
Commission through its administrative law
judge issued findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and an order allowing death benefits for applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the
widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who died of a
heart attack while working as a miner for
plaintiff Price River Coal Co. ("PRC").
Mrs. Mabbutt's claim for compensation was
based upon the Workers' Compensation
Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed.f
Supp.1986), which allows compensation to
"the dependents of every such employee
who is killed, by accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment." PRC's
motion for reconsideration or review was
denied by the Industrial Commission. PRC
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thereupon filed this action for review. We
remand for additional findings of fact.
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on October 23, 1981, at the end of his eight-hour
shift as a belt attendant in PRC's underground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mabbutt's job consisted of keeping certain underground conveyor belts working and of
keeping the belt rollers and the area surrounding these belts free of coal dust and
other materials which fall from the belts or
collect around them in the normal course of
their operation.
According to both parties, the crux of
this case is the question of whether there is
substantial evidence to support the decision
of the administrative law judge that Fred
Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent
death satisfies the requirement of section
35-1-45 that the death be "by accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment." However, both sides disagree
about the appropriate legal standard to be
applied in evaluating the evidence. Therefore, we have two questions on appeal.
The first is, What constitutes a compensable "accident"? The second question is
whether the evidence of Mr. Mabbutt's activities on the day of his death satisfies the
element of causation such that the accident, if one did occur, was in fact related to
his employment.
There is no need to dwell at length on the
question of the appropriate legal standard.
This issue has just been dealt with extensively in Allen v. Industrial Commission,
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). There we attempted to settle the meaning of the term
"by accident," which had become confused
by varying and inconsistent statements
from this Court over a long period of time.
The Allen definition is as follows: "Where
either the cause of the injury or the result
of an exertion was different from what
would normally be expected to occur, the
occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen,
unintended and therefore 'by accident/ "
Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). This
definition follows the standard articulated
in Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in
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earlier decisions of this Court that can be
traced back to 1922, including most notably
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This
standard has been followed most recently
in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890-91
(Utah 1981).
[1] Under the Allen standard, it is fairly easy to determine that Mr. Mabbutt did
die "by accident" on October 23, 1981. His
heart attack was certainly an "unexpected
or unintended" event that resulted in his
death. Allen v. Industrial Commission,
at 22. However, the finding that the
death was "by accident" does not complete
the analysis of whether the resulting injury
is compensable. Under Allen, the more
difficult question involves the determination of whether the injury had the requisite
connection with the employment duties—
whether it arose "out of or in the course of
... employment." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45
(1974 ed., Supp.1986); see Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 22.
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a
test to assure that there was a causal connection between the injury and the employment duties of the injured party was sometimes dealt with in our cases by requiring
that the occurrence resulting in the injury
be shown to have involved "unusual exertion." Allen v. Industrial Commission,
at 23. This is the standard apparently applied by the Commission in this case and
found to have been met.
However,
Allen
discarded
the
usual/unusual exertion distinction as a
means for determining whether the injury
was the result of an "accident." Instead,
the Court dealt with the causation requirement in more candid terms that focus
frankly on the questions of legal and medical causation. It delineated the analysis as
follows:
Under the legal test, the law must define
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of
"arising out of the employment" ...
[then] the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
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cient to support compensation) in fact
caused this [injury].
Id. at 25, citing Larson, Workmen's
Compensation§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277
(1986).
In applying the Allen analysis to the
present case, then, the first question is
whether legal cause has been shown. Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so
long as it is an activity connected with the
employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he
or she must show that the employment
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life0" Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26, In appraising whether
the employee's exertion would be usual or
ordinary in nonemployment life, an objective standard is to be applied that is based
on the nonemployment life of the average
person, not the nonemployment life of a
particular worker. Id. The requirement
of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is
designed to screen out those injuries that
result from a personal condition which the
worker brings to the job, rather than from
exertions required of the employee in the
workplace. Id. at 25.*
In the present case, Mabbutt was suffering from a preexisting condition which contributed greatly to his heart attack. The
evidence is uncontroverted that he had hypertensive cardiovascular disease, atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and possibly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hypertension was exacerbated by his obesity and
possibly a high salt diet. He was a diabetic
and had gout. The doctor on the medical
1. As a practical matter, when the Allen standard
is being applied to cases which may involve
preexisting conditions, before evidence is taken
on the issue of legal cause, the Commission
would be well-advised to first make a determination of whether or not the preexisting condition does in fact exist. If a preexisting condition exists, then the parties and the hearing
officer will know that the "extraordinary exertion" test will be applied to the facts as they are
developed, and the evidence can be appropriately prepared and marshalled for presentation to

35

panel to which this case was referred by
the administrative law judge concluded
that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's
work "had any relationship to [his] development of coronary artery disease."
[2] Since Mabbutt brought heart disease to the workplace, before legal causation can be established, the Commission
must find that his employment activities
involved exertion or stress in excess of the
normally expected level of nonemployment
activity for men and women in the latter
half of the twentieth century. If such a
finding is made, then the requirement of
legal cause is satisfied because it is-pre:
sumed that the employment increased the
risk of injury to which that worker was
otherwise subject in his nonemployment
life* At that point, the inquiry shifts to
medical cause, i.e.t whether the injured party's work-related activities were, in fact,
causally linked to the injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, at 26.
The question of whether the employment
activities of a given employee are sufficient
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or
extraordinary effort involves two steps.
First, the agency must determine as a mat- ~NN
ter of fact exactly what were the employment-related activities of the injured employee. Second, the agency must decide
whether those activities amounted to unusual or extraordinary exertion. This second determination is a mixed question of
law and fact
._^
[3] Because the whole legal cause determination hinges upon the agency's findings as to what the injured worker's job-related activities were, our review of the
Commission's decision must begin with
those findings. In the present case, we are
the fact finder. If a preexisting condition does
not exist, the hearing may be expedited because
there will be no need to show how hard the
employee was or was not working, only that the
employment activity led to the injury. Of
course, even if a preexisting condition is involved, if the Commission finds that legal cause
does exist, then it is still appropriate to refer the
matter to a medical panel to determine whether
the facts, as determined at the legal cause hearing, are sufficient to establish medical causation.
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unable to affirm the Commission's ruling
because of the inadequacy of these findings. In his job, Mabbutt worked alone in
the mine, and he encountered only one person while working on the day of his death.
For that reason, it was necessary to infer
what Mabbutt's activities were from the
conflicting evidence adduced at the hearing
before the administrative law judge. The
company brought in an expert to describe
his understanding of the exertion required
to perform that particular job. His testimony would support a conclusion that no
unusual or extraordinary effort was required. On the other hand, Mabbutt's widow introduced testimony from a fellow
worker who described how she had seen
Mabbutt perform the work, testimony that
might support a conclusion that the effort
required was unusual. This testimony was
disputed by the company.
Unfortunately, the administrative law
judge's findings do not resolve the conflicts
in the testimony and do not indicate that he
made a finding as to exactly what Mabbutt's activities were on the day of his
death. Absent such findings, it is impossible for us to take the next step and determine whether Mabbutt's work-related activities, as found by the Commission, rose
to the level necessary to satisfy the "unusual or extraordinary" exertion threshold
established by Allen for injured employees
with preexisting problems.
The administrative law judge found that
"Mabbutt died as the result of an accident
in the course of his employment ... resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with his employment." It may be
argued that this is a sufficient finding of
legal cause to warrant our affirming the
Commission on this point. However, the
"finding" of unusual exertion and stress is
2. We reject, categorically, the suggestion advanced by the company that because the belt-attendant job is sometimes performed by women,
it must necessarily involve less than extraordinary effort or strain. We take judicial notice of
the fact that women, as a group, tend to be
smaller in size and have less physical strength
than do men, as a group. However, with respect to size and strength, individual men and
women are arrayed over a continuum from one
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nothing more than a conclusion, It is not
supported by anything that could be construed as a finding as to precisely what
Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death.
We cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion
of fact and law when its necessary premises are not evident.
[4,5] There is an added problem here.
The Commission decided this case under
Tpre-Allen law. We cannot determine
whether the administrative law judge used
the words "unusual exertion" in the same
sense as they have been defined by Allen.
A talismanic incantation of "unusual or
extraordinary exertion" is not a substitute
for careful analysis by the Commission of
whether the actual job-related activities in
question exceed the normally expected level of activity for men and women in the
latter half of the twentieth century.2 In
the present case, we are uncertain of the
standard applied by the Commission and
cannot tell how the stated conclusion was
reached. For that reason, we must reverse
and remand the matter to the Commisnion
so that proper findings of fact can be entered and the Allen standard can be applied to them to determine legal cause.
A word about the issue of medical cause.
As noted, the administrative law judge did
not resolve conflicts in the testimony about
Mabbutt's work activities. However, he
did adopt the findings of the medical panel,
which contained a doctor's assumptions
about what Mabbutt was actually doing on
the day in question, and which then relied
on those factual assumptions in finding a
causal link between the work and his death.
The factual recitation in the panel report
was derived from the conflicting evidence
presented at the hearing and inferences
drawn from that evidence. In a number of
extreme to the other. No generalization can be
made that because a woman performs a certain
job it necessarily involves strength and exertion
requirements at the lower end of the spectrum,
and the contrary is, of course, true of a job
performed by a man. Each job's demands must
be evaluated on their own; they cannot be categorized as requiring "usual" or "unusual" exertion simply because they are normally done by
women or men, respectively.
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respects, as the company demonstrated at
the hearing on its objections to the medical
panel report and in its brief on appeal, the
panel was confused as to some of the basic
duties of Mabbutt's job and made assumptions about his actual activities which are
unsupported by the evidence.
[6,7] It is not the role of the medical
panel to resolve conflicts in the factual
evidence regarding the injured party's activities. Section 35-1-85 of the Code places
that responsibility solely on the Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.).
Under Alien, as before, the medical panel
is only to take the facts as found by the
administrative law judge and consider them
in light of its medical expertise to assist the
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause has been proves The
medical panel strays beyond its province
when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative law judge
improperly abdicates his function if he permits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v.
Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978).
We acknowledge that during the adjudication of this matter, the Commission was
laboring under the confusing and conflicting state of the law as it had developed
prior to Allen. The issues presented by
this and similar cases should be easier to
resolve in the future. However, questions
of some subtlety will remain in cases involving claims for internal failure where
the worker has a preexisting condition that
contributes to the injury and where a determination must be made as to whether a
specific work activity amounts to "unusual
or extraordinary" exertion. The concept of
"unusual or extraordinary" exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of
necessity, the process of pouring specific
content into that concept will rely heavily
upon the Commission's expertise in and
familiarity with the work environment.
This case is remanded to the Industrial
Commission for findings of fact as to what
Mabbutt's activities actually were on the
day of his death. Based upon those findings and upon a review of Allen, the Commission may then adhere to or abandon its
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conclusion that those activities amounted to
extraordinary exertion. Because the determination of medical cause must be based
upon the Commission's findings as to the
actual activities of the worker, and because
the panel's report in the present case rested upon the medical panel's improper assumptions as to the facts, the Commission
should resubmit the question of medical
causation to the panel after it has made the
appropriate factual findings.
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice (dissenting):
I dissent. In one of the first important
tests of the rules laid down in Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986), the majority reverses and remands
to "resubmit the question of medical causations to the panel." But the medical panel
has already addressed that exact question,
and the administrative law judge found
that the decedent's death was caused by
his job-related activities on the day that the
fatal accident occurred. What more the
court expects than has been done by the
Commission is not explained by the majority. The administrative law judge was correct in his ruling, the Commission so found,
and I agree.
It is precisely this kind of case that demonstrates that our newly formulated methods of analysis will inevitably draw the
Commission off into pathways that are
bound, I believe, to lead to error. The
Court's unfortunate requirement that,
since Mabbutt had a preexisting condition,
the Commission must find "that his employment activities involved exertion or
stress in excess of the normally expected
level of activity for men and women in the
latter of the twentieth century," is precisely the discriminatory application of workers' compensation laws to workers with a
preexisting condition, which I referred to in
my dissent in Allen.
I would affirm on the authority of Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983), and Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah
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1981).
Like Pittsburgh
Testing and
Monfrediy the decedent's preexisting coronary condition was clearly aggravated in
this case. The administrative law judge
made that clear in his findings:
[T]here is no ^yay of knowing exactly
how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the
applicant first felt the effects of that
stress or at what time he actually died
but it could have been some hours before
4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to
speculate as to those times or as to the
excessive stress or exertion later in the
afternoon in view of the fact that two
fine cardiologists have agreed that the
evidence is sufficient to convince them
that the death was industrially related.
The Administrative Law Judge finds
that Mr. Mabbutt died as the result of an
accident in the course of his employment
on October 23, 1981 resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with
his employment on that fateful afternoon.
I would affirm. The Commission has
found the necessary facts, and it is not for
us to ignore them.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of STEWART, Associate C.J.
rwi
(O
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Hanson, J., of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute for value. Defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart,
Associate C.J., held that there was probable
cause for officer's stop and search of defendant's truck.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result in which Durham, J.,
joined.
1. Arrest <3=>63.5(6)
Probable cause requirement for search
is subject to narrow exception for stops of
moving vehicles where police officers have
articulable suspicion that automobile's occupants are involved in criminal activity.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
2. Searches and Seizures <s=>40
Validity of determination of probable
cause to conduct search is made from objective standpoint of prudent, reasonable,
cautious police officer guided by his experience and training. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
4.
3. Searches and Seizures <§=>40
Determination of whether probable
cause existed to conduct search depends
upon examination of all information available to searching officer in light of circumstances as they existed at time search was
made. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
4. Searches and Seizures <s=>41
In making determination of probable
cause justifying search, police officer is
entitled to rely on information gained from
other police officers. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 4.

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Joseph P. DORSEY, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20124.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 31, 1986.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy
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5. Arrest <s=*63.5(6)
Drugs and Narcotics <3=*183
Although actual observations of police
officer conducting search were not enough
to rise to the level of probable cause, information that he received from other officers
involved in undercover narcotics buy was
sufficient for him to conclude there was
probable cause for stop and search of defendant's truck. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.

ADDENDUM 3:

Utah Transit Authority v. Booth, 728 P.2d
1012 (Utah 1986)
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work site first aid station, where the back
pain was first diagnosed.

standard to determine whether an accident
occurred.
In denying compensation, the Commis[8] The second step of the causation
sion specifically found:
test requires proof of medical cause. We
The testimony offered at the time of the
are unable to dispose of this question," howHearing indicates that, although some
ever, because the claimant was not allowed
stress occurred in getting to the work
to present any evidence of medical causasite, the incident precipitating the injution and the case was not referred to a
ries
was the everyday action of getting
medical panel. We therefore conclude that
into
a
suit of heavy and unwieldy coverthe administrative law judge committed realls.
No
accident occurred during the
versible error in not allowing the claimant
periods
of
exertion immediately prior to
to present medical evidence pertinent to the
the
precipitating
event.
issue of medical causation.
The facts of this case clearly support the
The claimant also argues that the adminforegoing
findings of fact and the concluistrative law judge erred in not referring
sion
to
be
drawn therefrom that no accihis case to a medical panel. Reference to
dent
occurred.
the medical panel is controlled by statute.
I would affirm the order of the CommisIn 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the require- sion.
ment of a mandatory referral to the mediSTEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting
cal panel to a permissive referral. Under
the statute as now written, "the commis- opinion of HALL, C.J.
sion may refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
V.5 -^v-iM^V
commission." (Emphasis added.) Although referral to the medical panel is not
required by statute, we believe in this case
that the findings of that panel would aid
the administrative law judge. See Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985)
UTAH TRANSIT
(evidence of causal connection between
AUTHORITY, Plaintiff,
work-related event and the injury may be
v,
uncertain or highly technical whereby failSteve BOOTH and the Industrial
ure to refer the case may be an abuse of
Commission of Utah,
discretion).
Defendants.
Our holding on the medical evidence isNo. 20788.
sue is dispositive of this appeal. The judgSupreme Court of Utah.
ment is reversed and the case remanded
for a determination of medical causation
Nov. 19, 1986.
and a subsequent ruling consistent with
this opinion.
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. as result of having to drive bus without
power steering on morning when there was
HALL, Chief Justice: (dissenting).
"extreme" amount of snow in streets, filed
For the reasons stated in my dissent in claim for workmen's compensation. The
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d Transit Authority denied liability. Driver
15, 28-29 (Utah 1986), I do not join the appealed. The administrative law judge
Court in applying an "unexpected result" awarded driver 11 days temporary total
40
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disability benefits. Transit Authority appealed. The Industrial Commission affirmed. Transit Authority appealed. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) driver was
injured "by accident," and (2) legal causation was established.
Affirmed.
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UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. BOOTH

1. Workers' Compensation <s=>569
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc
as result of having to drive old bus which
was not normally driven by driver and
which did not have power steering, on
morning when there was "extreme"
amount of snow on streets, was injured "by
accident/' for purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
2. Workers' Compensation <s=»597
In order for injured employee to recover under Workmen's Compensation Act, legal causation must be established, and test
of legal causation varies with employee's
condition; if employee has preexisting injury that is aggravated by subsequent accident, higher threshold of legal causation is
applicable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
3. Workers' Compensation <3=>1532
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc
as result of having to drive old bus, which
was not normally driven by driver and
which did not have power steering, on
morning when there was "extreme"
amount of snow on streets, and who was
not shown to have had any preexisting
back condition, satisfied lower threshold of
legal causation necessary to recover under
Workmen's Compensation Act; medical
causation was also established by the
record. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.

Linda L.W. Roth, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Ralph L.
Finlayson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
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PER CURIAM:
Utah Transit Authority (UTA) appeals
from a decision of the Industrial Commission affirming an order of the administrative law judge which* awards benefits to
Steve Booth for a work-related injury. We
affirm.
Booth has been an employee of UTA for
more than ten years. On January 8, 1985,
he was working his regular shift as a bus
operator, driving a 1976 manually steered
GMC 48-foot coach. Normally Booth operated one of the 1983 or 1984 series of
coaches which were equipped with power
steering. He drove the older buses infrequently, sometimes not more than once a
monthc That particular morning there was
an "extreme" amount of snow on the
streets. Booth was inbound going west on
6200 South and was negotiating a turn
north onto Highland Drive when he suddenly felt a popping in his back, accompanied by sharp pain. He momentarily lost
control over the wheel, so that the bus
went straight, but regained power over the
bus and continued his route. He immediately radioed UTA to ask for a relief operator as he would not be able to finish his
shift. After discharging his passengers,
Booth had to be lifted out of his seat and
was driven by his supervisor to the Salt
Lake Industrial Clinic. Medical examination and a CAT Scan revealed a swollen
disc. The attending physician prescribed
bed rest and medication. Booth was absent from work until January 21. He incurred medical expenses of $465 and temporary total disability amounting to
$335.57.
UTA denied liability on the ground that
Booth had a prior history of back trouble,
and the injury was not a compensable "accident" No evidence of prior disability
was presented at the hearing, and the administrative law judge awarded Booth eleven days temporary total disability benefits.
In its petition for a writ of review, UTA
contends that the administrative law judge
improperly based the award on an unanticipated and unintended injury, whereas an
injury must result from an occurrence
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which is "unanticipated and unintended" in
order to be compensable. The issue here is
whether Booth was injured "by accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment" as provided by section 35-1-45 of
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act.
[1-3] As the administrative law judge
noted, the controversy over what constitutes a compensable injury has been raging
for some time. However, this Court's decision in Allen v. Industrial Commission,
— P.2d
, slip op. 20026, filed November 14, 1986, has settled this issue with
respect to the test to be applied. Under
Allen, the present case plainly meets the
test for an injury occurring "by accident."
However, an additional question must be
answered: was there legal causation? Under Allen, the test of legal causation varies
with the employee's condition. If he or she
has a preexisting injury that is aggravated
by the subsequent accident, a higher
threshold of legal causation is applicable.
Allen at
. Here, the applicant was not
shown to have had any preexisting back
condition, although UTA did put the matter
in issue. Therefore, the lower Allen
threshold of legal causation applies, one
that is easily satisfied here. Id. at
.
Medical causation was also established by
the record.
The Commission's ruling is affirmed.

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Richard Louis SMITH, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19103.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 19, 1986.
Defendant was convicted of theft by
deception and theft by receiving stolen
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property by the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J., by
jury verdict. Defendant appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, A.C.J., held that:
(1) it was harmless error to exclude defendant's testimony concerning his emphysema
and tuberculosis offered as tending to show
that defendant had strong motivation to
avoid imprisonment, and (2) it was harmless error to exclude defendant's testimony
that defendant erroneously believed that
his parole officer had extremely broad power to revoke his parole offered as tending
to show that defendant had strong motivation to avoid imprisonment.
Affirmed.
Durham, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Criminal Law <3=»361(1)
Proof of guilty knowledge, like proof
of intent, is usually circumstantial, and defendant should be allowed to introduce evidence which is circumstantially inconsistent
with state of mind required for conviction.
2. Criminal Law <fc»342
Evidence of motive is generally relevant circumstantial evidence of state of
mind, and defendant's lack of motive to
commit crime charged is also relevant evidence of his innocence which defendant is
entitled to place before jury; that persuasiveness of evidence may be weak or
inconclusive goes to its weight, not its. admissibility.
3. Criminal Law <s=>1170(l)
It was harmless error to exclude defendant's testimony concerning defendant's
emphysema and tuberculosis offered as
tending to show defendant had strong motivation to avoid imprisonment and thus
would not have knowingly or intentionally
committed theft by deception or theft by
receiving stolen property; persuasiveness
of excluded testimony was weak compared
with existing incriminatory evidence.

ADDENDUM 4:

Miera v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1023
(Utah 1986)
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MIERA v. INDUSTR1 L COM'N OF UTAH
Cite as 728 P.2d

vides conclusive evidence that stabilization
occurred three months after the accident.
It should be noted that the "three-month"
finding of the panel did not directly relate
to the date of stabilization: it concerned
the apportionment of medical costs between current injury and preexisting conditions. In any event, the Commission has
the discretion to accept or reject a panel's
report even in the absence of objections.
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 provides:
If no objections are so filed ..., the
report shall be deemed admitted in evidence and the commission may base its
finding and decision on the report of the
panel, but shall not be bound by such
report if there is other substantial conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the commission.
The record in the instant case includes
substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that Wallace's condition
stabilized on November 29, 1983. On that
date, Wallace's personal physician rated
Wallace's permanent partial impairment after characterizing his status as "fairly well
stabilized."
The Commission's order is affirmed. No
costs awarded.
HOWE, J., dissents.
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al injury, and worker sought review. The
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that aggravation of preexisting spondylolisthesis of
lumbosacral spine as result of heavy lifting
and jumping into hole to tend sump pump
in course of employment was compensable
industrial injury, even though onset of pain
was gradual.
Remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.

Workers' Compensation <s=558
Aggravation of preexisting spondylolisthesis of lumbosacral spine as result of
heavy lifting and jumping into hole to tend
sump pump in course of employment was
compensable industrial injury, even though
onset of pain was gradual, as jumps were
considerably greater exertion than that encountered in nonemployment life, and work
activities which allegedly caused injury
were capable of producing lumbar strain
aggravating preexisting problem.

Robert J. Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Frank V.
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mary A. Rudolph,
Gilbert Martinez (2nd Injury), Salt Lake
City, for defendants.

Michael F. MIERA, Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, Utah Construction & Development, Inc., State Insurance Fund, and
Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 19411.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 25, 1986. .
The Industrial Commission denied
worker compensation benefits for industri-
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HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff Michael F. Miera seeks review
of an Industrial Commission order affirming an administrative law judge's denial to
Miera of compensation for an industrial
injury.
Miera had been employed for two and
one-half years as a carpenter with Utah
Construction & Development, Inc., when he
sustained an industrial injury on June 25,
1981. On that day he was engaged in
cleaning six-inch by ten-foot steel forms
weighing approximately fifty pounds. He
lifted the forms onto a saw horse, cleaned
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them and then loaded them on a trailer. At
the same time, he was required to tend a
sump pump in an eight-foot-deep pit. A
shelf at the four-foot level facilitated his
descent into the hole so that he could move
the hose whenever the pump ran dry. During a four-hour period Miera alternated between cleaning and stacking forms, and
jumping four feet onto the shelf and then
into the hole, a total of eight times at
thirty-minute intervals. Approximately
one or two hours later while raking concrete, he first felt back pain which did not
become disabling until the next day when
he had to ask fellow workers to carry his
part of the load.
Miera underwent medical treatment for
three months, was told to discontinue
heavy lifting, and did not return to work
for his employer The latter's insurer,
State Insurance Fund, paid all medical expenses and temporary total compensation.
The matter was referred to a medical panel
which found a preexisting spondylolisthesis
of the lumbosacral spine, possibly aggravated by the work activities as described by
Miera. The panel concluded that "whether
or not this constitutes an industrial injury
would have to be determined by the court."
In her findings of fact, the administrative law judge stated that there was no
question in her mind that the work performed by Miera on June 25, 1981, was
"clearly related to the onset of his pain.
And in fact, findings of the medical panel
bear this out/' However, the administrative law judge felt bound by the decision in
Farmers Grain Co-op v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980), and regretted that that
decision seemed to preclude an award of
benefits because the onset of the pain was
gradual, not identified with a specific
event, and was related to normal duties
associated with the job while pouring concrete. The Industrial Commission, in a
two-to-one decision, affirmed that holding.
Miera contends that the administrative
law judge erred in denying him compensation based on her finding that no accident
occurred because he noticed a gradual onset of pain which he could not relate to a
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specific event. The State Insurance Fund
relies on that gradual development of pain
and the lack of a specific event in its demand that this case be decided in consonance with similar cases in which this
Court took the position that a compensable
accident had not occurred. Farmers
Grain Co-op, supra; Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Pintar v.
Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 276,
382 P.2d 414 (1963). The Fund also argues
that plaintiffs injury would not be compensable under those cases which hold that the
occurrence was completely unrelated to the
work performance. Billings Computer
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 R2d 104 (Utah
1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo,
642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial
Commission and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328
(Utah 1979).
Factually, this case resembles Nuzum v.
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corporation, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), where
the plaintiffs decedent died from a heart
attack after manually operating a stuck
dumper by climbing in and out of a six-foot
cab to release the load. This Court in that
case held that the internal failure was a
direct result of the just-described exertion.
As in that case, the issue here is whether
Miera was injured "by accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment" as
provided by U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. The
administrative law judge found that an industrial injury had occurred, but denied
compensation because she questioned the
accidental nature of the injury.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission,
Utah, -— P.2d
(1986), we redefined
the unexpected result of a work-related
activity as a compensable accident if both
medical and legal causation could be
shown. Applied to the instant case, the
legal causation test is satisfied, even
though Miera's history of spondylolisthesis
places him in a personal risk situation. His
jumps into an eight-foot hole from a fourfoot platform at thirty-minute intervals
constitute a considerably greater exertion
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NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N
than that encountered in non-employment
life and are therefore legally sufficient.
The medical causation test is likewise satisfied by the medical panel's finding that
"the work activities as described over a
three-day period could produce a lumbar
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem
he had hade" No more is needed to hold
that Miera suffered a compensable industrial accident.
The case is remanded for a medical evaluation of Miera's industrial injury in proportion to his previous disability and a commensurate apportionment of benefit payments between the Second Injury Fund and
the State Insurance Fund. Costs are
awarded to Miera.

4

HALL, C.J, and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
*4 1

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
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Bruce D. NORTON, Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, United States Steel
Corporation, [Self-insured Employer],
and the Second Injury Fund of the
State of Utah, Defendants,
No. 21017.
Supreme Court of Utah.

ry, educational limitations, learning disability, and age, in concert with his multiple
disabling condition and need for total reeducation.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Workers' Compensation <s=»1639
Finding that worker was not permanently totally disabled was not supported
by sufficient evidence where Industrial
Commission failed to consider worker's vocational history, educational limitations,
learning disability, and age, in concert with
his multiple disabling conditions and need
for total reeducation.
2. Workers' Compensation <$=»847
Fact that worker continued work for
six years after accident, standing alone, did
not foreclose worker's claim that he was
permanently totally disabled where worker
spent those six years in considerable pain.
3. Workers' Compensation <§=>847
Relevant factors in determining whether worker who returned to work after accident is permanently totally disabled include
probable dependability with which injured
worker can sell his services in competitive
labor market, probability of future impairment of future earning capacity as indicated by nature of injury, age of worker,
and other relevant factors.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>1377
Only where employee returns to work
after accident under normal conditions will
presumption of no loss of earning capacity
stay unassailed.

Nov. 25, 1986.
In petition for review, worker challenged decision of Industrial Commission
denying his claim for permanent total disability. The Supreme Court held that finding that worker was not permanently totally disabled was not supported by sufficient
evidence where Industrial Commission
failed to consider worker's vocational histo-
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Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for Indus. Com'n.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Second Injury.
Phil N. Walker, San Francisco, Cal, for
U.S. Steel.

ADDENDUM 5:

Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson, 733
P.2d 178 (Utah 1987)
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This approach is inadequate and ignores
the other necessary questions: first,
whether the crime charged is a single offense that can be committed in more than
one way or, instead, multiple offenses; second, if a single offense is charged, whether
the alternative methods of commission are
significantly distinct from one another in
terms of their legal or factual content; and
third, whether there is evidence on each of
the alternatives. I agree that the three
sections of Utah's second degree murder
statute, under which the defendant in this
case was charged, define a single offense
that may be committed in three separate
ways. I further agree that the three alternatives are not meaningfully distinct from
one another because they merely address
different forms of mens rea, any or all of
which could properly be inferred from the
evidence and any or all of which are proper
predicates for guilt of the offense charged.
Finally, I agree that there was adequate
evidence to permit conviction based on any
of the three alternative mental states at
the time of the killing. Therefore, I concur
in the majority's result, and only object to
the overly broad scope of the opinion and
its failure to refine adequately the standards for appropriate application of the
unanimity rule in other cases.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the
result

RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and Utah
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs,
v.
Lydia J. TORGERSON and Utah State
Industrial Commission, Defendants.
No. 20412.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 12, 1987.
Employer and state insurance fund
sought reversal of award of compensation

4ft

and medical benefits for aggravation of
preexisting industrial injury. The Supreme
Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) employee,
who injured back while lifting 190-pound
patient with one arm and reaching with
other arm to straighten shirt, suffered
work-related and unexpected injury that
aggravated preexisting industrial injury
and that resulted from unusual or extraordinary exertion, and (2) Industrial Commission was required to consider separate accidents serially and to apportion liability.
Remanded.

1. Workers' Compensation @=5569
Employee, who injured back while lifting 190-pound patient with one arm and
reaching with other arm to straighten
shirt, suffered work-related and unexpected injury that aggravated preexisting
industrial injury and that resulted from
unusual or extraordinary exertion and suffered "injury as the result of an accident/'
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Workers' Compensation <s=>845
Industrial Commission awarding benefits for compensable injury that aggravated preexisting injury was required to treat
accidents serially and determine percentage
of impairment attributable to each accident
and proportion that preexisting impairment
bore to total combined impairment and was
required to apportion liability so that employer and second injury fund were each
liable for one half of benefits paid for
previous accident, so that employer was
liable for one third of benefits paid for
subsequent accident, and so that second
injury fund was liable for two thirds of
benefits paid for subsequent accident.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 35-1-69(1).

Fred R. Silvester, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs.

RICHFIELD CARE CE NTER v. TORGERSON
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event for which a claim is being made is for
the incident that occurred on January 20,
1982." Thereafter, the administrative law
HALL, Chief Justice:
judge determined that the 1982 incident, in
Plaintiffs seek reversal of an award of and of itself, did not constitute an "accicompensation and medical benefits for ag- dent" and by order dated May 4, 1983,
gravation of a preexisting industrial injury. denied an award of benefits.
The primary issue presented is whether the
Torgerson sought and obtained leave to
incident that caused the aggravation consti- amend her application for benefits to intuted "an injury as the result of an acci- clude both the 1980 and the 1982 incidents.
dent" within the purview of U.C.A., 1953, The administrative law judge vacated his
§ 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.) (amend- order of May 4, 1983, and reopened the
ed 1984). We conclude that it did and case. He then referred the matter to a
affirm the award.
medical panel for evaluation of the effects
Defendant Lydia J. Torgerson's employ- of the July 1980 incident and the January
ment with plaintiff Richfield Care Center 1982 incident. The medical panel found:
As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is
consisted of dressing patients and preparconcerned, it is the opinion of the Panel
ing them for their daily routines. Many
that this is related to the industrial accipatients were totally helpless and were in
dent. It is our opinion that this began
need of physical assistance in performing
with the injury of 1978, was aggravated
normal daily activities.
by the injury of 1980, and was further
On July 6, 1980, while assisting a patient
aggravated and required surgery followto a chair, Torgerson lost her balance and
ing
the injury of 1982.
was thrown against a wall and onto the
floor. She suffered pain in her lower back,
The medical panel also concluded "that
immediately reported the incident to her the injuries of 1980 and 1982 did medically
employer, and received medical treatment aggravate the pre-existing impaired condifrom Drs. Allen and Henrie. She also un- tion of the Applicant" and fixed the total
dertook physical therapy for six months percentage of permanent physical impairand wore a back brace continuously there- ment at seven and one-half percent—two
after.
and one-half percent attributable to condiOn January 20, 1982, Torgerson was lift- tions prior to the July 1980 injury, two and
ing a one hundred ninety-pound patient one-half percent attributable to the July
with one arm and reached with the other 1980 injury, and two and one-half percent
arm to straighten his T-shirt. In doing so, attributable to the January 1982 injury.
she felt a sudden pain in her lower back.
The administrative law judge adopted the
She immediately reported the incident to findings of the medical panel as his own
her employer and sought medical attention and awarded benefits for the 1980 injury
the same day. She underwent conservative and the 1982 incident as well, inasmuch as
treatment for the next several months and it was an accident that aggravated a previfinally surgery in September 1982 for a ous industrial injury incurred in the same
herniated disk.
employment Disability benefits were orTorgerson filed an application for bene- dered to be shared two-thirds by the emfits for the 1982 incident; plaintiff Utah ployer and one-third by the Second Injury
State Insurance Fund denied liability and Fund.
moved to join the Second Injury Fund bePlaintiffs do not challenge the award of
cause of the 1980 injury. Following a hear- benefits for the 1980 industrial injury.
ing, the administrative law judge conclud- Their challenge goes only to the award of
ed: "The 1980 incident was clearly an in- additional benefits for aggravation of the
dustrial accident, but no claim is made by preexisting injury caused by the 1982 incithe applicant for that incident. The only dent, their contention being that the 1982
Michael R. Labrum, Richfield, for defendants.
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incident arose out of the performance of
ordinary work activities and therefore did
not constitute a compensable accident.
They cite and rely upon Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabol in support of their contention. However, the analysis of what constitutes an "accident" followed in the Sabo
line of cases has since been abandoned in
favor of the "unexpected result" standard
espoused by the Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission:2
We therefore reaffirm those cases which
hold that an accident is an unexpected or
unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an injury.
We thus necessarily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in the Redman line
of cases which predicates the "accident"
determination upon the occurrence of an
unusual event.3
[1] The facts of the 1982 incident fit
well within the rule of law as espoused in
Allen because (1) the claimant's injury was
work related and unexpected; (2) the legal
causation test applicable to a claimant suffering from a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury, namely, that
there be an unusual or extraordinary exertion (here, lifting with one arm a one hundred ninety-pound patient), was met; and
(3) medical causation was amply established by the evidence. Application of the
foregoing principles of law to the facts of
this case supports our holding that the
Commission's award was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.
Plaintiffs' remaining contention is that
the Commission erred in treating the 1980
and 1982 incidents as a single industrial
accident rather than serially in apportioning liability between the employer and the
Second Injury Fund.
[2] Jacobsen Construction v. Hair4 interprets U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69(1) (Repl.

Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1983) (amended
1984), which provided that "the liability of
the employer for such compensation ...
shall be for the industrial injury only and
the remainder shall be paid out of the second injury fund . . . " and concluded that
the employer's proportion of the liability
for compensation is equal to the percentage
of the permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury. Thus,
the Commission must consider separate accidents serially in order to determine the
percentage of impairment attributable to
each accident and the proportion the preexisting impairment bears to the total com-,
bined impairment.5
In the instant case, following the 1980
accident, Torgerson had a total impairment
of five percent, two and one-half percent
attributable to preexisting conditions and
two and one-half percent attributable to the
1980 accident. Following the 1982 incident,
Torgerson had a seven and one-half percent
total impairment, five percent attributable
to preexisting conditions. Thus, the proper
apportionment of liability should be onehalf to the employer and one-half to the
Second Injury Fund for the benefits paid
for the 1980 accident and one-third to the
employer and two-thirds to the Second Injury Fund for the benefits paid for the 1982
accident.6
The case is remanded for the purpose of
entering an order apportioning liability consistent with this opinion. No costs awarded.
STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ„ concur.

1. 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); see also Farmers 4. 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983).
Grain Coop. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980);
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 5c See Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & CabiIndustrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979);
net Shop, 684 P.2d 1269, 1270-71 (Utah 1984).
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969).
6. The relatively low figures involved make calculation pursuant to the method found in Per2. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
ry's Mill unnecessary.
3. Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).

50

ADDENDUM 6:

Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008
(Utah 1986)
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operation,1 that it was not possible to make
an accounting of the money received by the
partners during their 25 years of operating
the partnership, and that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, Judge Daniels
would presume that the partners were satisfied with the distribution of partnership
proceeds during the course of the partnership. We do not believe, however, that
that ruling can stand. Judge Croft's ruling
that it was impossible to account for income over the 25 years of the partnership
was a reference to the Harris-Fidler partnership only. Genave clearly had the duty
to account for all funds withdrawn from
Harris partnership accounts.
[8] Judge Croft's order specifically stated that the estate was to provide William
with an accounting of the amounts in
James' account, "including those funds
transferred by [Genave] before the death
of James." Harris v. Tanner, 624 P.2d at
1137. The $12,000 was withdrawn from a
Harris partnership account by Genave at
her father's request. The withdrawal occurred during the period of difficulties between James, Genave, and William which
gave rise to this litigation. Under Judge
Croft's order, the estate had the burden to
provide an accounting of the funds in account No. 3. The only evidence adduced in
the trial before Judge Daniels with respect
to Zion's account No. 3 was that $12,000
was withdrawn prior to James' death and
transferred to James' daughter's account.
The estate admitted that the account was a
partnership account and that the $30.58
balance in it at the time of James' death
was partnership money. Given the estate's
burden of proof to show that the $12,000
was not partnership money and its failure
to do so, and especially in light of the above
evidence, we hold that William is entitled to
one-half the $12,000 dollars withdrawn
from the account.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for a modification of the judgment in accord with this opinion. No costs.
1. Apparently William was not actively prevented by his brother and sisters from carrying on
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HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur.
HALL, C.J., does not participate herein.
Sv\
(O

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

Don J. HONE, Plaintiff,
v.
J.F. SHEA COMPANY and the
Industrial Commission of
Utah, Defendants.
No. 19709.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 18, 1986.

The Industrial Commission denied
claim for workers' compensation benefits
for back injury, and worker appealed. The
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
injury incurred while putting on coveralls
was accident for purposes of Workers'
Compensation Act; (2) injury was legally
caused by working conditions; and (3) refusal of administrative law judge to allow
worker to present medical evidence pertinent to issue of medical causation was reversible error.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, CJ., dissented and filed opinion
in which Stewart, J., concurred.

1. Workers' Compensation <£=>518
Incident need not involve external bodily contact to qualify as compensable injury,
and internal failure may also qualify as
accident within meaning of Workers' Compensation Act. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
partnership business until 1970.
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2. Workers' Compensation <s=>516
Key question in determining whether
incident is injury entitling worker to workers' compensation benefits is whether occurrence was unexpected cause of injury or
unexpected result of exertion.
3. Workers' Compensation <s»569
Injury to worker's back incurred while
putting on coveralls was accident within
meaning of Workers' Compensation Act
where worker unexpectedly and without
forewarning or anticipation injured his
back while putting on his coveralls, and
there was no evidence indicating that claimant had experienced repeated pain or injury
as with occupational disease or other foreseeable injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>609
Determination of whether injury is
compensable accident requires proof of
causal connection between injury and working conditions.
5c Workers' Compensation <$=>618
In determining whether working conditions were legal cause of injury, Supreme
Court examines whether worker brings
preexisting condition to employment in order to distinguish those disabilities that are
more likely than not produced by risk related to employment from one caused by personal risk that employee with preexisting
condition brings to workplace.
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>553, 568
Where claimant has preexisting condition, he must prove that extraordinary or
unusual exertion led to injury in order for
injury to be compensable accident, but
where claimant does not suffer preexisting
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=»619
Worker's injury was legally caused by
working conditions where worker suffered
no preexisting injuries, worker was injured
as he was putting on heavy and unwieldy
coveralls, and coveralls were required for
work in which worker was engaged.
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8. Workers' Compensation <©=>1396, 1937
Refusal of administrative law judge to
allow worker to present medical evidence
pertinent to issue of medical causation was
reversible error where injury was accident
within meaning of Workers' Compensation
Act, and injury was legally caused by
working conditions. UcG.A.1953, 35-1-45.
Joseph E. Tesch, Heber, Robert B. Denton, Robert W. Brandt, Michael K. Mohrman, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Gilbert
Martinez (2nd Inj), Salt Lake City, for defendants.
DURHAM, Justice:
The claimant, Don J. Hone, appeals from
a decision of the Industrial Commission
(Commission) denying his claim for workers' compensation for a back injury suffered while at work. We reverse and remand for further findings of fact.
The claimant began working for J.F.
Shea Company on a project north of Currant Creek, Utah, on November 1, 1982.
On November 19, 1982, while putting on a
pair of coveralls, the claimant heard a snapping sound in his back, saw stars, and felt
pain. The company nurse advised him to
see a doctor in Heber City. He was driven
about fifteen miles to his truck, and he
then drove another forty-five miles to Heber. Prior to this incident the claimant had
suffered no back problems.
Doctors diagnosed the claimant's back
injury as low lumbar sprain with spasms of
both paravertebral muscle masses, commonly known as "back spasms." While in
the hospital he also suffered from pulmonary embolisms with lung abscess and
pneumonia. He returned to work in April
1983, but could not perform his job because
of breathing problems. He has not suffered any back problems since his hospital
release in January 1983.
The claimant filed for workers' compensation benefits pursuant to U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45. An administrative law judge
denied that claim on the ground that the
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incident described by the claimant was not
a compensable accident. The Commission
then denied the claimant's motion for review and affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge. The Commission
wrote:
The testimony offered at the time of the
Hearing indicates that, although some
stress occurred in getting to the work
site, the incident precipitating the injuries was the everyday action of getting
into a suit of heavy and unwieldy coveralls. No accident occurred during the
periods of exertion immediately prior to
the precipitating event. Testimony by
the applicant indicated that the snap in
his back occurred prior to any type of
slip or fall. The event subsequent to the
snap are [sic] in question because of conflicting testimony. There is no history of
prior industrial injuries (or non-industrial
injuries) to the low back which would
support a theory of cumulative trauma,
as in the Monfreidi [sic] case. [Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981)].
The claimant argues four issues on appeal: He first asserts that the administrative law judge and the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously refused to consider
evidence of prior stress and tension in finding that no accident occurred within the
meaning of the Workers' Compensation
Act. Second, he claims that the administrative law judge erred in refusing to allow
the claimant to present medical evidence
establishing the cause of his injury. Third,
he argues that the administrative law
judge and the Commission erred in failing
to refer the claim to a medical panel to
determine whether the injury was an accident. Finally, the claimant argues that the
administrative law judge's decision is unreviewable because he failed to make adequate findings of fact and to demonstrate
any legal analysis. In order to treat these
arguments, we must first determine whether Hone's back injury is a compensable
injury under section 35-1-45.
[1] Section 35-1-45 provides for an
award of benefits to an employee who is
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injured "by [an] accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment
" The
Act does not define the term "accident."
Perhaps the most common type of incident
constituting an accident occurs when an
employee is struck by or falls against an
object. An incident need not, however, involve external bodily contact to qualify as a
compensable accident. An internal failure
may also qualify as an accident within the
meaning of the Act. Jones v. California
Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244 P.2d
640, 642 (1952).
We recently set forth the analysis we
intend to follow in accident cases involving
internal failures in Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, (Utah 1986).
There, after discussing alternative definitions of the term "by accident," we cited
with approval the definition of "accident"
found in Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965):
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events
[T]his is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such manner
as to properly fall within the definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as occupational
diseases
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citations
omitted).
We then explained that the key ingredient of an industrial accident is an unexpected occurrence. That occurrence may
be "either the cause or the result of an
injury." Allen, at 22. We expressly rejected the position that the determination
of an "accident" depends upon the happening of an unusual event or occurrence such
as a slip, a fall, or an extraordinary exertion. Id. ^ We said that so long as "the
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cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore by accident" Id. at
22.
[2,3] In determining whether a compensable accident occurred in this case, the
Commission applied the legal standard
from Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi That case
affirmed an award of workers' compensation benefits to an employee who suffered
a back injury resulting from exertion or
stress from shoveling coal. In Monfredi
the Court applied the "cumulative trauma"
theory from Carling whereby an internal
failure may be an accident if it is a " 'climax* due to exertion, stress, or other repetitive cause ... in such a manner as to
properly fall within the definition of an
accident." 631 P.2d at 892 (quoting from
Carling, 16 Utah at 261-62, 399 P.2d at
203). In the case at bar, the Commission
distinguished Monfredi on the basis that
Mr, Monfredi, unlike Mr. Hone, had a history of work-related accidents and a job-induced preexisting condition. That distinction is unnecessary in light of the definition
of "by accident" announced in Allen.
Whether the claimant had a preexisting
condition is relevant to the issue of causation, but is not determinative of whether
the injury occurred "by accident" The key
question here is whether the occurrence'
was the unexpected cause of the injury or
the unexpected result of an exertion. The
evidence in this case reveals that the claimant unexpectedly and without any forewarning or anticipation injured his back
while putting on his coveralls. None of the
evidence indicated that the claimant had
experienced repeated pain or injury as with
an occupational disease or other foreseeable injury. Under these circumstances, the
injury in the case at bar was "by accident"
[4-6] The next step in determining
whether an injury is a compensable accident requires analysis of whether the injury arose out of or in the course of employment Allen, at 25. This factor requires
proof of a causal connection between the
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injury and the working conditions. In Allen v. Industrial Commission, we adopted
a two-part causation test proposed by Professor Larson. Under that test, we first
consider the legal cause of the injury and
then its medical cause. In the*Tegal causation inquiry, we examine whether the
claimant brings a preexisting condition to
the employment in order to distinguish
those disabilities that are more likely than
not produced by a risk related to the employment from one that is caused by a
personal risk that an employee with a
preexisting condition brings to the workplace. Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.,
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Mel982). Under this
test, when the claimant has a preexisting
condition, he must prove that an extraordinary or unusual exertion led to the injury.
When the claimant does not suffer a preexisting condition, usual or ordinary exertion
is sufficient. Allen, at 25. The comparison between the usual and unusual exertion is defined according to an objective
standard. " 'Note that the comparison is
not with this employee's usual exertion in
his employment but with the exertions of
normal nonemployment life of this or any
other person.'" Id. at 26 (quoting Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.83(b)
at 7-279 (1986)).
[7] The Commission never considered
the question of legal causation in this case.
However, because there is sufficient evidence in the record, we will not remand on
this issue. The evidence clearly indicates
that the legal cause test was met in this
case. The administrative law judge found
that the claimant had suffered no preexisting injuries. Therefore, he needs to show
only that the injury occurred during a
usual or ordinary exertion. The evidence is
undisputed that the claimant was injured
as he began to put on "heavy and unwieldy
coveralls" at work Those coveralls were
required for the outdoor construction work
in which the claimant was engaged. Proof
of legal causation is further substantiated
by the fact that immediately after the incident the claimant saw the nurse at the
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work site first aid station, where the back
pain was first diagnosed.
[8] The second step of the causation
test requires proof of medical cause. We
are unable to dispose of this question, however, because the claimant was not allowed
to present any evidence of medical causation and the case was not referred to a
medical panel. We therefore conclude that
the administrative law judge committed reversible error in not allowing the claimant
to present medical evidence pertinent to the
issue of medical causation.
The claimant also argues that the administrative law judge erred in not referring
his case to a medical panel. Reference to
the medical panel is controlled by statute.
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-77 and changed the requirement of a mandatory referral to the medical panel to a permissive referral. Under
the statute as now written, "the commission may refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission/' (Emphasis added.) Although referral to the medical panel is not
required by statute, we believe in this case
that the findings of that panel would aid
the administrative law judge. See Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985)
(evidence of causal connection between
work-related event and the injury may be
uncertain or highly technical whereby failure to refer the case may be an abuse of
discretion).
Our holding on the medical evidence issue is dispositive of this appeal. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded
for a determination of medical causation
and a subsequent ruling consistent with
this opinion.
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (dissenting).
For the reasons stated in my dissent in
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d
15, 28-29 (Utah 1986), I do not join the
Court in applying an "unexpected result"
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standard to determine whether an accident
occurred.
In denying compensation, the Commission specifically found:
The testimony offered at the time of the
Hearing indicates that, although some
stress occurred in getting to the work
site, the incident precipitating the injuries was the everyday action of getting
into a suit of heavy and unwieldy coveralls. No accident occurred during the
periods of exertion immediately prior to
the precipitating event.
The facts of this case clearly support the
foregoing findings of fact and the conclusion to be drawn therefrom that no accident occurred.
I would affirm the order of the Commission.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HALL, C.J.

UTAH TRANSIT
AUTHORITY, Plaintiff,
v.
Steve BOOTH and the Industrial
Commission of Utah,
Defendants.
No. 20788.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 19, 1986.
Bus driver, who suffered swollen disc
as result of having to drive bus without
power steering on morning when there was
"extreme" amount of snow in streets, filed
claim for workmen's compensation. The
Transit Authority denied liability. Driver
appealed. The administrative law judge
awarded driver 11 days temporary total

ADDENDUM 7: Champion Home Builders v. Industrial
Commission. 703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985)
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306 Utah

pay Mrs. Jacobsen's costs and attorneyfees on appeal.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

1. Workers' Compensation <3=»1939.4(4)
The Supreme Court reviews Industrial
Commission's findings of fact only to determine whether the findings are supported
by substantial evidence.
2. Workers' Compensation <3=»1506
Causal connection between worker lifting a heavy beam and perforation of his
ulcer was established by substantial evidence, including letter from physician stating that conceivably the perforation would
not have occurred if worker had not lifted
beam, and evidence that abdominal pain
occurred upon lifting. U.C.A. 1953, 35-145.

STEWART, J., dissents.

CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS and
Aetna Casualty and Surety,
Plaintiffs,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP
UTAH and John S. Skrlac,
Defendants.
No. 20332.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 18, 1985.

In a worker's compensation proceeding, worker was awarded medical expenses
and temporary total disability for perforation of his duodenal ulcer, allegedly
caused by heavy lifting at place of employment. Employer's motion to the Industrial
Commission for review was denied. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) the causal connection between the heavy lifting and the
perforation of the ulcer had been established by substantial evidence; (2) lifting
the heavy beam was an "accident" within
purview of the worker's compensation statute; and (3) failure to refer the case to a
medical panel was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Zimmerman, J., concurred in the result.
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3. Workers' Compensation <&»545
Lifting an unusually heavy beam at
place of employment, causing worker's ulcer to rupture, was an "accident" within
scope of worker's compensation statute.
U.C.A. 1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers' Compensation <S:»1309
Failure of administrative law judge to
refer worker's compensation case to medical panel was not abuse of discretion,
where causal connection between work-related accident and injury was established
by substantial evidence.
Christopher A. Tolboe, Salt Lake City,
for appellant.
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, Pete N.
Vlahos, Ogden, for respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
John Skrlac was awarded medical expenses and temporary total disability for
perforation of his duodenum resulting from
heavy lifting at work. His employer,
Champion Home Builders, appeals. We affirm.
Skrlac built rafters and ceilings for
Champion Home Builders on an assembly
line. On August 4, 1983, while lifting a
heavy beam, Skrlac felt a sharp pain in his
side. A medical examination by a Dr. Hi11am following the pain showed that claimant had a perforated duodenal ulcer and
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that an operation on claimant's duodenum
was required.
Skrlac applied for worker's compensation
benefits. At the hearing, a letter from Dr.
Hillam was introduced which stated that
although Dr. Hillam knew of no medical
data which cites lifting as a cause of ulcer
perforation, he was aware that lifting
causes an increase in stomach pressure,
and that ulcers perforate more often when
there is an increase in stomach pressure.
In a follow-up letter, Dr. Hillam concluded
that "[i]t is certainly conceivable that had
[Skrlac] not been lifting, the ulcer may not
have perforated at all." No other expert
medical testimony or evidence was adduced
and the matter was not referred to a medical panel.
The administrative law judge found that
Skrlac's lifting was a cause of the ulcer
perforation. He analogized this case to
hernia and heart attack cases in which the
exertion is not the sole cause of the hernia
or heart attack, but is a ' 'precipitating
factor," without which the hernia or heart
attack may never have occurred. Champion Home Builders filed a motion for review, which the Industrial Commission denied.
On appeal, Champion Home Builders argues that the evidence failed to establish a
causal connection between the lifting and
the perforation. It relies on Dr. Hillam's
statement in his letter that he knew of no
medical data which cites lifting as a cause
of ulcer perforation.
[1] In reviewing Industrial Commission
findings of fact, we determine only whether the Commission's findings are supported
by substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp.
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 675 P.2d
1187, 1192 (1983); Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 385, 57 P.2d 724, 725
(1936).
The governing statute is U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-45, which provides for compensation or death benefits if an employee is
injured or killed "by accident arising out of
or in the course of his employment." Under that section, the claimant must prove
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that the work-related event was a contributing cause of the injury. Higgins v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 700 P.2d 704
(1985); Schmidt v. Industrial
Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (1980); Maker v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals
Board, 33 Cal3d 729, 190 Cal.Rptr. 904,
661 P.2d 1058, 1063(1983).
[2] In this case, Dr. Hillam's evidence
and the occurrence of abdominal pain at
the moment of lifting constitute substantial
evidence sufficient to support the Commission's finding that there was a causal connection between Skrlac's lifting and the
ulcer perforation.
Other jurisdictions have also sustained
awards for perforated ulcers on evidence
that the ulcer perforated or ruptured during heavy lifting or straining. E.g., Truelove v. Hulette, 103 Ga.App. 641, 120
S.E.2d 342 (1961); Cutno v. Neeb Kearney
& Co., 237 La. 828, 112 So.2d 628 (1959);
Jennings v. Simon Manges & Sons, Inc.,
284 A.D. 1071, 136 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1954). See
also cases cited at IB A. Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law § 38.20 n. 43
(1982).
[3] Champion Home Builders argues
that no "accident" occurred in this case
within the scope of § 35-1-45 because
Skrlac's ulcer could have perforated as easily at home as at work, and cites as its
sole support Billings Computer Corp. v.
Tarango, Utah, 674 P.2d 104 (1983). In
Billings we vacated an award of benefits
because the claimant failed to establish
that an "accident" had occurred when she
kneeled at work and felt a sharp pain in
her knee. We reasoned: "The fact that
[claimant's] injury occurred while at work
was mere coincidence
[T]he circumstances which precipitated her injury were
in no way unusual . . . . " Id. at 106-107.
However, in this case the circumstances
were clearly unusual: Skrlac was lifting a
very heavy double beam which ordinarily
required two people to lift. That the ulcer
perforated while claimant was lifting the
beam was not a mere coincidence.
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[4] Finally, Champion Home Builders
argues that the administrative law judge
abused his discretion by not referring this
case to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann.,
1953, § 35-1-77 (Supp,1983), provides that
where the employer or insurance carrier
denies liability, "the commission may refer
the medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the commission . . . . "
(Emphasis added.) In some cases, such as
where the evidence of causal connection
between the work-related event and the
injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the case to a medical panel
may be an abuse of discretion. However,
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on the facts of this case, we think there
was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result.

